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Abstract 
 
Despite the importance of studying marriage patterns for a better understanding of colonial 
life, the subject has received little attention from a purely economic perspective. In his 
seminal work, European Marriage Patterns in Perspective (1965), J. Hajnal introduces the 
notion of a European Marriage Pattern (EMP) emerging in the late Middle Ages which 
became characteristic of Western European society in the early modern period. Hajnal points 
out several distinct aspects to distinguish Western European marriages from all other 
societies of the time. While existing literature in this field has typically focussed on the 
demographic features of marriage patterns, such as the average age of marriage, the share of 
the population that had never married, and the effects of the EMP on fertility and resulting 
population growth, little attention has been paid to the underlying mechanisms and causes of 
the EMP.  
 
Using genealogical records to track the ancestry of colonial settlers in South Africa, this 
study will investigate the evolution of marriage in the Cape Colony. The focus is primarily on 
the persistence of the EMP and attempt to determine whether it continued to characterise the 
marriages of European descendents outside of Europe, or whether a distinct marriage pattern 
emerged in the Cape Colony in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It will explore the 
effect that such patterns may have historically had on family size, standards of living and life 
chances for European settlers at the Cape, with an aim to shed new light on the underlying 
causes of the EMP, by critically evaluating De Moor and van Zanden’s (2010) three 
hypotheses of the origins of this distinct marriage pattern.  
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Uittreksel 
 
Ten spyte van die bydrae wat ’n studie van huwelikspatrone tot ’n beter begrip van die 
ekonomiese ontwikkeling en sosiale konteks tydens die koloniale era kan maak, ontvang 
hierdie onderwerp min aandag vanuit 'n suiwer ekonomiese perspektief. In John Hajnal se 
bekende publikasie, European Marriage Patterns in Perspective (1965), stel hy die konsep 
van 'n Europese Huweliks Patroon (EHP) voor.  Hierdie patroon het waarskynlik in die laat-
Middeleeue verskyn en die Wes-Europese samelewing in die vroeë-moderne tydperk 
gekenmerk. Hajnal beskryf sekere unieke aspekte wat Wes-Europese huwelike van alle ander 
samelewings van hierdie tydperk onderskei. Bestaande literatuur oor hierdie onderwerp fokus 
tipies op di e demografiese kenmerke van huwelikspatrone, soos die gemiddelde ouderdom 
waarop individue trou, die gedeelte van die bevolking wat nooit trou nie en die gevolge wat 
die EHP op f ertiliteit en bevolkingsgroei het. Min aandag is dus aan die onderliggende 
oorsake van die EHP gegee. 
Deur gebruik te maak van die Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters is dit moontlik om die 
herkoms van koloniale setlaars in Suid-Afrika na te spoor. Hierdie studie fokus dus op die 
ontwikkeling van ’n huwelikspatroon in die Kaapkolonie. Die vraag is of die EHP die 
huwelike van Europese afstammelinge buite Europa steeds gekenmerk het en of daar ’n ander 
huwelikspatroon in die agtiende en vroeë-negentiende eeu in die Kaapkolonie na vore gekom 
het. Die vraag word beantwoord deur ’n kritiese analise van De Moor en van Zanden (2010) 
se drie hipoteses oor die oorsprong van hierdie eiesoortige huwelikspatroon. 
 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
It would not have been possible to write this thesis without the help and support of the kind 
people around me, only some of whom it is possible to give particular mention here. 
 
First and foremost I wish to say a word of thanks to the Genealogical Institute of South 
Africa for kindly allowing me to make use of the South African Genealogical Registers, 
which forms the primary data source for this study. These registers represents over a 
century’s effort by South African genealogists, many of whom devoted their entire lives to 
creating and expanding this vast database. In doing so they have, perhaps unintentionally, 
provided economic historians with a rich source for exploring South African settler 
demographic history, and for this I am extremely grateful. 
 
Then to my supervisor, Johan Fourie at the University of Stellenbosch, I express my sincere 
gratitude for his continued insight, support and patience, as always, for which my mere 
expression of thanks likewise does not suffice. 
 
Special thanks to my sister, Marie Cilliers, for the custom-design and creation of the data-
manipulation programme, without which, the compilation of the dataset for this study would 
not have been possible 
 
Last but not least, I want to thank my parents and friends, for bringing me endless 
encouragement and happiness during the past year.  
 
For any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this work, of course, the responsibility is 
entirely my own.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 
 
Contents 
 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... 3 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 4 
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 5 
1.1 Orientation ....................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Statement of the Problem ................................................................................. 5 
1.3 Research Objectives and Methodology ........................................................... 6 
1.4 Chapter Outlay ................................................................................................. 6 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................................. 8 
2.1 Contextualization ............................................................................................. 8 
2.2 The cultural differences hypothesis ............................................................... 10 
2.3 Overview of the European Marriage Pattern ................................................. 13 
2.4 A review of the literature since the detection of the EMP ............................. 17 
2.5 Addressing the causes of the EMP................................................................. 21 
2.6 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................... 25 
Chapter 3: Cape Colony Marriage in Perspective .............................................................. 27 
3.1 A unique colonial case study ......................................................................... 27 
3.2 European heritage, religion and social structure ............................................ 28 
3.3 Early Cape marriage customs ........................................................................ 32 
3.4 Huguenot marriage......................................................................................... 34 
3.5 Some benchmark results ................................................................................ 36 
3.6 New data sources ........................................................................................... 39 
3.7 New results: expanding our knowledge of settler marriage ........................... 45 
3.8 Concluding remarks ....................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 4: Revisiting the EMP ............................................................................................. 48 
4.1 Consensus, inheritance and familial marriage strategies at the Cape ............ 48 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2 
 
4.3 Accessibility to, and the size of, the labour market .................................. 54 
4.4 Explaining the Pseudo-EMP at the Cape .................................................. 57 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 59 
Reference List ......................................................................................................................... 61 
Appendices .............................................................................................................................. 66 
Appendix A: Tables and Figures ......................................................................... 66 
Appendix B: Digitising GISA (2008) .................................................................. 69 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of sample size and population estimates……………………………..42 
Figure 2: Comparison of sample size and marriage dummy…………………………………42 
Figure 3: Gender pyramid by age at death, 1700-1749………………………………………44 
Figure 4: Gender pyramids by age at death, 1749-1799……………………………………..44 
Figure 5: Gender pyramid by age at death, 1800-1849………………………………………45 
Figure 6: Age at first marriage and household size at the Cape, 1700-1850…………..…….58 
Figure A1: Median life span of settlers by decade of death with 95 per cent confidence bands: 
1700 -1940…………………………………………………………………………………....68 
 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Single population as per cent of total population in age group……………………..14 
Table 2: Mean ages at first marriage for countries displaying the EMP……………………..16 
Table 3: Mean ages at first marriage for countries displaying the non-EMP………………...17 
Table 4: Mean age at first marriage in English dioceses……………………………….…….19  
Table 5: Age at marriage of first-time married settlers at the Cape………………………….37 
Table 6: Age of husbands by age of wives at first marriage at the Cape, before 1760………37 
Table 7: Length of marriage of first-time married settlers…………………………………...38 
Table 8: Remarriage rates at the Cape before 1760……………………………………….…39 
Table 9: Summary of new age at first marriage results at the Cape, 1700-1850…………….46 
Table A1: Census Population: White Settlers, African and Asian Slaves, Free Blacks and 
Knechts. Summary of Totals…………………………………………………………………66 
Table A2: Life span of adult settlers…………………………………………………………66 
Table A3: Average number of children of adult settlers……………………………………..67 
Table A4: Fertility of female settlers………………………………………………………...68 
Table A5: Employment type as percentage of the population by district, 1732………..……68 
 
 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
The neglect of marriage by economists is either a major oversight or persuasive evidence 
of the limited scope of economic analysis – Gary Becker (1973). 
1.1 Orientation 
Despite the obvious importance of marriage patterns for an understanding of colonial life, the 
subject has received little attention from economists. The age at which persons, especially 
women, first marry is a subject of considerable interest, since a woman is seldom able to bear 
children for more than the thirty years between ages fifteen and forty-five.  A ge at first 
marriage for women therefore plays a vital role in determining how many children she can 
bear and thus directly affects family size and the growth rate of the population (Wells, 1972: 
415). In addition, higher female age at marriage allows women to enhance their human 
capital both formally and informally in the years before childbearing, resulting in an increase 
in human capital acquisition for the population, as more educated women will generally raise 
more skilled children (Foreman-Peck, 2011:292).  
In his seminal work, European Marriage Patterns in Perspective (1965), John Hajnal 
introduces the notion of a European Marriage Pattern (EMP) emerging in the late Middle 
Ages which became characteristic of Western European society in the early modern period. 
Hajnal points out several distinct aspects that he argues, distinguishes Western European 
marriages from all other societies of the time, namely (i) high age at first marriage, 
particularly for women and (ii) a large percentage of the population who never marry. The 
increase in the stock of human capital that resulted from this unique demographic trend 
directly contributed to Western Europe’s developmental success (Foreman-Peck, 2011:292). 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Existing literature in this field has typically focussed on t he demographic features of this 
marriage pattern, such as the average age of marriage, the share of the population who never 
married, and the effects of the EMP on f ertility and resulting population growth. Little 
attention has been paid to the underlying mechanisms and causes of the EMP until recently.  
De Moor and van Zanden (2010) are the first to formally present an explanation for the 
emergence of the EMP. Their argument rests on a combination of three socio-economic and 
ideological factors namely (i) the shift towards consensus instead of parental authority in the 
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formation of a marriage, (ii) the position of women in the transfer of property between 
husband and wife and between parents and children and (iii) the accessibility to, and the size 
of, the labour market.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Methodology 
This study aims to add to this literature in three ways: Firstly, by using genealogical records 
to track the ancestry of colonial settlers in South Africa, this investigation will provide for the 
first time, descriptive statistics of Cape Colony marriage patterns for the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century. It will focus on t he evolution of marriage in the Cape Colony, 
looking primarily for the persistence of the EMP in an attempt to determine whether it 
continued to characterise the marriages of European descendents outside of Europe, or 
whether a distinct marriage pattern emerged in the Cape Colony. 
Secondly, it will provide an argument for the Cape Colony as a more suitable testing ground 
to display the unique features of the EMP. It will further provide a critical discussion of the 
validity and potential shortcomings of the three De Moor and van Zanden hypotheses, and the 
underlying causes of the EMP will be scrutinised against the new knowledge of Cape Colony 
marriage patterns.  
Finally, it will explore the effect that such marriage patterns may have historically had on 
family size and standards of living for European settlers in the Cape, as well as provide a 
benchmark upon w hich comparisons with marriage patterns in other colonial settler 
populations can be made.  
1.4 Chapter Outlay 
Chapter two contextualizes this study within the European economic history discourse in its 
broadest sense. A detailed introduction to the European Marriage Pattern: its origin, 
characteristics and significance is provided. An overview of the literature subsequent to the 
detection of the EMP is undertaken, highlighting the want for a concentrated effort on the 
part of scholars in the field over the last four decades to provide a unified explanation for the 
underlying causes of the EMP.  
Chapter three presents an overview of the existing knowledge on early Cape Colony marriage 
patterns together with a discussion of the implications of these marriage patterns on e arly 
settler life. Secondly it will provide the necessary expansion, both in size and scope of these 
results using the latest genealogical registers as primary data source. Estimates of age at first 
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marriage for male and female settlers for the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries are 
calculated. Finally an assessment of whether these patterns conform to the characteristics of 
the EMP is undertaken.  
A discussion of the validity and potential shortcomings of the three De Moor and van Zanden 
hypotheses for the causes of the EMP are scrutinised against new knowledge of Cape Colony 
marriage patterns in chapter 4.  Chapter 5 concludes.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Contextualization 
 
Why Europe? Why did a relatively small and backwater periphery on the western 
fringes of the Eurasian continent, burst out into the world in the sixteenth century and 
by the nineteenth century had become a dominant force in almost all corners of the 
earth? 
This simple question, posed by Gale Stokes in her 2004 Review of Recent Macrohistories, 
remains without a simple explanation. Indeed, the question has chronically been revisited 
over the last half century, but a consensus has yet to be reached as to the underlying causes of 
northwestern Europe’s developmental success.  
Attempts to explain “why Europe and not the rest” are not in short supply. Notable scholars 
include Diamond (1997), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine 
(2002), Rodrik and Subramanian (2003), and Landes (2006), all of whom have taken 
somewhat contrasting views by placing greater emphasis on c ertain factors over others in 
their respective accounts of the workings of the past.  A ccording to Stokes (2004), these 
views can be divided into two main camps: Those who maintain that there was “something 
unique in the European past lay behind its eventual economic development and power”, and 
those who believe that there was ultimately “nothing particularly special about Europe and 
that its rise to dominance in the nineteenth century was not due to any exceptional qualities 
but to its good fortune at being able to seize vast amounts of gold and silver in the New 
World and to create other forms of wealth through colonial trade” (Stokes, 2001:509).  
The latter is broadly in line with what is commonly referred to as the geography hypothesis. 
With a large following, both in the popular imagination and in academia, this hypothesis 
maintains that the “geography, climate and ecology of a society shape both its technology and 
the incentives of its inhabitants” (Acemoglu, 2003:27).Yet among those who are unsatisfied 
with an explanation that relies almost entirely on luck, most have taken to investigating what 
set north-western Europe apart from the rest of the world at the time – in the hope of 
uncovering a unique set of conditions that presided in this region alone, that were particularly 
conducive to an economic take-off. One of the prominent scholars in this group is David 
Landes, who in his exploration of The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1999) makes strong 
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arguments for three unique and nonmaterial aspects of European society that fortified its 
developmental fate.  
The first explanation offered by Landes is a somewhat paradoxical combination of factors 
that on the one hand portrays Europe divided: as a result of ethnic heterogeneity and lack of a 
unified political centre, without which the resulting competition would not have led to the 
race to conquer the Atlantic that characterised Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
On the other hand, Landes offers a view of Europe united by a common academic language 
(Latin), which succeeded in facilitating the prevailing adversarial discourse, through which 
scholars were able to share technological advancements, disseminating new scientific 
knowledge across the continent with relative ease.  The result was the “development of 
science as an autonomous method of intellectual inquiry that succeeded in disengaging itself 
from the social constraints imposed by organised religion and from the political constraints of 
centralised authority” (Stokes, 2001:510).  
The second factor that Landes suggests set Europe apart was the prevailing work ethic that 
emphasised resourcefulness and empowerment. In his words: “What counts is work, thrift, 
honesty, patience, [and] tenacity. The only route to economic success for individuals or states 
is working hard, spending less than you earn, and investing the rest in productive capacity” 
(1999:523). In short, the fact that Europeans have historically prospered is simply down to 
the fact that they have consistently followed these fundamental practices. 
Landes’ third explanation centres on t he indigenous technology (for example the water 
wheel, spectacles, the mechanical clock, the printing press and gun powder). However, 
possessing superior technology in itself is not sufficient in explaining the kind of 
developmental success Europe enjoyed. Even if Europe did benefit from better technology, 
which Landes believes it did, the talent that distinguished Europe from the rest was their 
capacity to integrate knowledge from other cultures, like adopting gun powder and paper 
from the Chinese through the Muslim world. Landes suggests that a “systematic resistance to 
learning” from other cultures was China’s greatest obstacle before the Eighteenth century. 
Although Landes does not stress property rights (the most powerful discussion of that aspect 
of Western development remains the domain of Douglas C. North and Robert Paul Thomas)1, 
one could categorise Landes’ arguments with what Acemoglu refers to as institutional 
                                                          
1 The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge, 1973) 
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hypotheses, in that they centre around human influences. Very simply stated, according to 
this view, “some societies have good institutions that encourage investment in machinery, 
human capital and better technologies, and consequently these countries achieve economic 
prosperity” (Acemoglu, 2003:27).  
Acemoglu qualifies his definition of good institutions by requiring them to possess three key 
characteristics, namely:  (i) the enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of 
society, so that a variety of individuals have incentives to invest and take part in economic 
life, (ii) constraints on t he actions of elites, politicians and other powerful groups, so that 
these people cannot expropriate the incomes and investments of others or create a h ighly 
uneven playing field, and (iii) some degree of equal opportunity for broad segments of 
society, so that individuals can make investments, especially in human capital and participate 
in productive economic opportunities (Acemoglu, 2003:27). 
While this study situates itself firmly within this body of literature, it i s by no means an 
attempt to confront such mega-economic questions. It is therefore necessary to refine our 
investigation to a large extent.  F or this we turn to a demographic, or perhaps more 
appropriately labelled, domestic explanation for an increase in the stock of human capital that 
underpins both the geography and institutional hypotheses.  
2.2 The cultural differences hypothesis 
Our attention therefore shifted to the cultural differences which have, in addition to Landes’ 
arguments, been used to explain why the Europeans rose to power in the nineteenth century. 
The economic effect of one such important cultural difference is clearly illustrated by the 
example of the cotton industries in China and Europe respectively. 
Referring to China, Stokes (2001:518) notes that during the Ming dynasty in spite of a 
thriving cotton trade industry, spinning and weaving technologies were never adopted in 
cotton production. Developments of this nature that would elsewhere have been attributed to 
capitalist-style systems of production never took root in China. Jack Goldstone (1996:7) 
proposes that this failure on the part of the cotton industry to evolve and adapt new 
technology as actively as the Europeans did can be attributed to the unavailability of a female 
labour force in China. This he argues, is a result of the difference in family structure that 
existed in Europe and China respectively.  
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Recent research into family patterns confirms that European families supposedly exhibited a 
greater affinity for “economically rational behaviour”, evident by later marriage and smaller 
households, contrasted with China where early marriage and larger families were the norm.  
Goldstone suggests that as a result of the traditional Chinese family structure, the so called 
“life path” of women was altered. In Europe women between their teenage years and 
marriage were typically wage earners, be it as a servant in a larger household or in a factory. 
The important cultural difference here was that women were viewed in society as individuals, 
capable of labour under the supervision of a non-family member. While their pay may have 
been less than that of their male counterparts, it was significantly more than they could have 
earned had they remained at home. 
In China however, the practice of spinning and weaving remained within the confines of the 
household and were viewed as women’s errands. While the final products of their labour may 
well have ended up en route to one of China’s trade partners, women did not receive the kind 
of compensation for their labour in the form of a wage like their European sisters. Most 
importantly, Chinese women were not viewed in society as individuals but rather as members 
of their family, and would remain so until marriage when they would become members of 
their husband’s family.  
Entrepreneurs in the Chinese cotton industry therefore did not have access to the kind of 
cheap female and child labour that was available in Europe. These entrepreneurs would have 
been forced to hire more expensive male labour, increasing the cost of cotton production to a 
point where they were not competitive to trade with. Disincentivised Chinese entrepreneurs 
chose not to relocate cotton production out of the household domain and into cotton mills, or 
to invest in more productive technology in cotton production (Goldstone, 1996:8). 
 Our primary investigation is thus transformed into a far narrower question that asks: How 
was the demographic transition that historically set Europe apart from the rest of the world 
unique? One possible explanation, or what Mary Hartman (2004:3) refers to as an 
“extraordinary development [that] has long been known but remains hidden in plain sight”, is 
detection of the European Marriage Pattern in the mid-1960’s by John Hajnal. This atypical 
and still unexplained household-formation system, featuring late marriage dominated north-
western Europe from the 1500’s and distinguished the region from all other major 
agricultural regions of the world.   
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While existing literature in this field has typically focussed on the demographic features of 
this marriage pattern, such as the average age of marriage, the share of the population that 
had never married, and the effects of the EMP on fertility and resulting population growth, 
according to De Moor and van Zanden (2010:3) little attention has been paid to the 
underlying mechanisms and causes of the EMP. Hartman does not find it surprising that a 
solid connection has yet to be established between the discovery of this idiosyncrasy in 
marriage and household arrangements and the distinctive ways Western history evolves after 
the middle ages for a number of reasons. One such reason, she suggests, hinges on t he 
priority historical texts have traditionally placed on the contributions of societal elites and are 
typically based on t he roles and responsibilities of men. Standard historical interpretation 
relies on results that are derived exclusively from extra-domestic sites, the focus of which has 
remained largely confined to political and economic spheres. 
Despite Hartman’s criticisms of the historical literature for perpetuating this “ingrained view” 
that denies any real role for women’s agency, domestic or otherwise, in contributing towards 
major developments in Europe’s socio-economic history and ultimately an account of global 
economic development, historians’ themes and approaches have slowly been evolving. 
Serendipitously timed with Hajnal’s publication dispelling the prevailing misconceptions 
about European marriage ages, the 1960’s witnessed not only the emergence of a new social 
history, but a new women’s history, that for the first time contested the exclusivity of elite 
men in economic development explanations by arguing that ordinary citizens’ actions, 
including the actions of women, must factor into explanations of how history unfolds 
(Hartman, 2004:4).  
Hartman tries to rectify this by arguing that the more extra-domestic arenas along with the 
course of modern history itself, owe their most noteworthy features to the still largely 
overlooked European marriage and household system. She suggests that within the 
households of north-western Europe, women’s behaviour mattered at least as much as men’s 
– not only for creating unique gender and power arrangements within those households but 
also for shaping major developments beyond them (Hartman, 2004:4). 
The recurring theme of this and the following chapters will be the still unexplored 
ramifications for Western historical development of the irregular north-western European 
system of late marriage. 
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2.3 Overview of the European Marriage Pattern 
In order to appreciate the uniqueness of the EMP, it is useful to distinguish its most general 
characteristics from traditional marriage patterns elsewhere in the world for the same time 
period. While marriage patterns across the world do vary widely, the agricultural societies of 
Southern and Eastern Europe, India, China, Africa and the Middle East are characterised by 
early marriage particularly for women and large age differences between spouses, with 
grooms typically being seven to ten years older than brides.  M arriages were traditionally 
arranged by the couples’ parents and it was not uncommon for a newly married couple to 
move into the home of the groom’s parents. Furthermore, it was rare to find a person who had 
remained single throughout their entire life.  
But at least since the late Middle Ages, young persons in north-western Europe began to 
deviate from these traditional marriage patterns. In England, the Low Countries, much of 
Scandinavia, northern France, and the German-speaking lands, most men and women adopted 
relatively late marriages and the age difference between spouses became significantly 
reduced. This is the first distinctive feature of Hajnals’ EMP that characterised marriages 
west of an imaginary line drawn roughly from Saint Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) in the 
former USSR to Trieste in Northern Italy. Hajnal refers to those countries east of this line as 
the “Eastern European Pattern” (EEP).  
While it is  true that the gentry continued to uphold early and family arranged marriage 
practices, they did not comprise the majority of the European population.  
From medieval times until the late eighteenth century or so, young persons in their 
late teens and twenties played the major role in selecting their own partners; and they 
usually did so as agricultural servants or apprentices residing in their employer’s 
households. At marriage, these couples typically pooled their resources and created a 
simple or nuclear household of their own, which meant that most residences in north-
western Europe housed just one married couple (Hartman, 2004:6). 
The second distinctive feature of the EMP is that a substantial portion of the population 
remains single throughout their lives, contrasted with almost universal marriage occurring in 
Eastern Europe. For example, by age 20-24 some three-quarters of women were still single in 
the European pattern while in Eastern Europe three quarters were married in this age group.  
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This is not to say that there were not significant differences between the marriage patterns of 
various western European countries; however, a distinct cleavage between any of them and 
the Eastern European pattern of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Russia or Serbia for instance was clear. 
This cleavage is particularly striking for women. Hajnal reports that in Western European 
countries fewer than 5 percent of women remained single around their 50th birthday. “In the 
European pattern unmarried life for an adult woman was accepted as a normal (if perhaps 
exceptional) alternative to marriage. In Eastern Europe this alternative scarcely existed” 
(Hajnal, 1965:103). 
Table 1 below is constructed from Hajnal’s data on the single population as a per cent of total 
population in the age group, shown here for two countries displaying the EMP – Belgium and 
Sweden; and two countries displaying the Eastern European Pattern – Bulgaria and Serbia2. 
The difference is striking, particularly for women. In those countries displaying the EMP the 
share of unmarried men and women in the youngest cohort was relatively large (above 70 per 
cent), implying that the majority of men and women remained single before the age of 25. 
This is contrasted with the Non-EMP countries in which over half of the men in the 20 to 24 
year old age cohort are already married and a staggering 16 per cent of women between the 
age of 20 to 24 remained single. More interesting is that in Bulgaria and Serbia only 1 percent 
of women remain unmarried after the age of 45 compared to 17 percent and 19 per cent in 
Belgium and Sweden respectively. 
Table 1: Single population as per cent of total population in age group 
 
 
Men Women 
Country 20-24 25-29 45-49 20-24 25-29 45-49 
"European Pattern" 
            Belgium 85 50 16 71 41 17 
      Sweden 92 61 13 80 52 19 
"Eastern European Pattern" 
            Bulgaria 58 23 3 24 3 1 
      Serbia 50 18 3 16 2 1 
Source: Hajnal (1965). 
                                                          2 These countries were chosen arbitrarily for illustrative purposes; however, the trend is equally clear for any of the other European nations. 
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A review of the published information before 1800 on distributions of population by marital 
status suggests the general conclusion that the European pattern originated before the 
eighteenth century. The European pattern of age at marriage can be traced back in many 
countries to the first half of the eighteenth century or even earlier. Before the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, there is almost no statistical evidence on marriage, at least so far as 
unselected data (i.e. covering all inhabitants of an area) are concerned.   
Hajnal concludes that the EMP is unique for all large populations for which data exist or 
reasonable surmises can be made: “In non-European civilizations there are scarcely any 
single women over 25” (Hajnal, 1965:107). Furthermore, little direct information on t he 
distribution of marriage by age for countries where the marriage pattern is non-European 
exists. Hajnal reasons that this may be attributed to the fact that in such countries in many 
cases formal marriage registration institutions were inadequate, if in existence at all.  Even in 
cases where registration may have accounted for the bulk of marriages, statistics of age are 
often unreliable since many people do not know their ages. 
To overcome this record-keeping deficiency, Hajnal (1965:108) employs an indirect method 
of calculating age at first marriage statistics. This method involves calculations from the 
proportions of single persons by age cohorts. His calculations reveal that a non-European 
pattern implies a mean age for marriages of single women below 21 whereas according to the 
European pattern the mean age for the marriages of single women must have been above 23, 
and has in general been above 24. Studies have rarely made use of age statements at the time 
of the marriage registration, since statements of age are generally not given or are too 
incomplete to be of much use in parish registers for the eighteenth century (Hajnal, 
1965:109). 
An alternative method of determining age at marriage is the somewhat painstaking process of 
matching each marriage certificate with the baptismal certificates of the spouses so that their 
ages can be determined directly from their date of birth. Table 2 provides a summary of mean 
ages at first marriage calculated using the above method, for countries displaying the EMP, 
including England, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, all of which have a mean age at 
first marriage for men and women generally over 24. In addition, the mean difference in ages 
between spouses is relatively small, with husbands being on average less than two years older 
than their wives. In contrast, Table 3 shows mean ages at first marriage for those countries 
displaying non-EMP. In all cases, the mean age of marriage for women is below 24 and the 
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mean difference in ages between spouses is significantly more pronounced than in the EMP, 
with husbands generally being over three years older than their wives. 
Table 2: Mean ages at first marriage for countries displaying the EMP. 
  
Mean age of 
husbands at first 
marriage 
Mean age of 
wives at first 
marriage 
Mean difference 
between 
spouses* 
England 
1600-1649 28 26 24 
1650-1699 27.8 26.5 15 
1700-1749 27.5 26.2 15 
1750-1799 26.4 24.9 19 
1800-1849 25.3 23.4 23 
Germany (Durlach) 
1701-1720 28.7 26.5 26 
1721-1750 27.4 25.4 24 
1751-1780 27.6 25.6 24 
1781-1800 26.6 25.1 17 
France 
Crulai (Normandy) (1674-1742) 26.6 25.1 17 
French Parish (1760-1790) 27.4 26.2 14 
Netherlands (Amsterdam both sexes) 
1626-1627 24.5 
  1676-1677 26.5 
  1726-1727 27.2 
  1776-1777 27.8 
  1809-1810 26.3    
 
*Age in months. Positive values indicate that the husband was older 
Source: Hajnal (1965). 
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Table 3: Mean ages at first marriage for countries displaying the non-EMP. 
  
Mean age of 
husbands at first 
marriage 
Mean age of 
wives at first 
marriage 
Mean difference 
between 
spouses* 
North America 
New Hampshire (Before 1720) 25.5 22.3 38 
New England (Before 1760) 27.1 23.3 46 
North Carolina (Before 1741) 23.8 19.6 50 
French Canada (1700-1730) 26.9 22.4 53 
Eastern Europe 
Serbia 
Mean age at first 
marriage for 
women. 
Mean age at 
marriage              
(all marriages)           
 1886-1895 20 21.7 
 1896-1905 19.7 21.3  
Source: Hajnal(1965); Gallman (1984). 
2.4 A review of the literature since the detection of the EMP 
Unfortunately, Hajnal’s work was largely overshadowed by the publication in the same year 
of distinguished Cambridge scholar Peter Laslett’s ground-breaking book The World We 
Have Lost: England before the Industrial Age (1965).  While his exposition of pre- and post-
industrial English society focuses far more on the nuclear composition of households, Laslett 
does attempt to debunk some of the more commonly held misbeliefs about marriage and 
extended family households, to shed new light on the, until then, relatively unexplored link 
between domestic relationships and economic development. While Laslett never directly cites 
Hajnal’s work on t he EMP, he does make use of similar demographic records and his 
argument undoubtedly supports Hajnals’ conclusions about northwestern European marriage 
patterns: 
It is not true to say that in earlier times, in the world we have lost, as we have called 
it, people, either ordinary or privileged, married much younger than we marry now. 
In fact, they were very much older in relation to their expectation of life. 
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Laslett creatively illustrates this common misconception by referring to frequent appearance 
of teen-brides in Shakespeare’s work, which one could argue, offers readers a form of social 
commentary on 16th century England. He quotes from the famous second scene of Romeo 
and Juliet in which Capulet beseeches the eager bachelor Paris, to delay his marriage 
proposal to his daughter:  
My child is yet a stranger in the world 
She hath not seen the change of fourteen years 
Let two more summer’s whither in their pride 
Ere we think her ripe to be a bride. 
 
Laslett (1965:84) goes on to cite a number of instances of teen-brides appearing throughout 
Shakespeare’s work to demonstrate the notion that English women of Shakespeare’s day 
might have married in their early teens, or even before. Yet after examining all available 
records and evidence of marriages in Elizabethan and Jacobean England, Laslett finds that 
this is simply not the case. Instead he reports that marriage at these early ages was rare and 
not nearly as common in late teens as it was in the first half of the twentieth century.  
In addition, the Church of England would not permit the marriage of persons under the age of 
the 21 w ithout the consent of both partners’ parents. Given that marriage licences were 
granted upon application to the bishop of the diocese which required the documentation of 
applicants’ ages, Laslett’s team was able to review a thousand licences containing the ages of 
applicants issued by the diocese of Canterbury between 1619 and 1660 to people marrying 
for the first time. Here follows a summary of their findings: 
One woman gave her age as 13, four as 15, twelve as 16: all the rest were 17 and 
over, and 966 of the women got married for the first time after the age of 19, that is 
nearly 85 per cent. The commonest age of first marriage for women in this sample 
was 22, and the median age was about 22¾ and the mean age about 24. Bridegrooms 
were something like three years older than brides, though some of the unions 
recorded showed an extraordinary discrepancy in age. Only ten men married below 
the age of 20, two of them at 18, and the most common age was 24; the median age 
was 25½ and the mean age over 26¾. 
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Laslett also considers the difference between ordinary citizen’s marriage tendencies against 
those of the gentry – after all Romeo and Juliet were not ordinary people.  While difficult to 
make broad generalizations given the small sample sizes at his disposal, he finds that gentle 
brides were younger than others in this area in the mid-seventeenth century but bridegrooms 
were of much that same age as the rest of the population. He concludes that no class of the 
population, as far as their results show, married at anything like the ages suggested by 
popular literature throughout the centuries3. Table 4 presents Laslett’s findings of marriage 
ages in English dioceses. 
Table 4: Mean age at first marriage in English dioceses  
  
Mean age of 
Bridegrooms 
Mean age of 
Brides  
All applicants for licences, Diocese of Canterbury,   
1619-1660 (1007 bridegrooms 1007 brides) 
26.65 23.58 
Standard deviation 4.61 4.12 
Gentry only amongst Canterbury applicants                  
(118 bridegrooms, 118 brides) 
26.18 21.75 
Standard deviation 4.41 3.60 
Marriage of nobles,* from about 1600-1625                
(325 brides, 313 bridegrooms) 
19.39 24.28 
Marriage of nobles,* from about 1625-1650                    
(510 brides, 403 brides) 
20.67 25.99 
SOURCES: P. Laslett. 1965. *from T. H. Hollongsworth of the University of Glasgow 
 
Laslett’s work in this field continued later in the 1960’s when he led a group of demographers 
from the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social structure, to launch the 
famous comparative global study entitled Household and Family in Past Time: Comparative 
Studies on the Size and Structure of the Domestic Group Over the Last Three Centuries in 
England, France, Serbia, Japan and Colonial North America, with further Materials from 
Western Europe. The study was embarked upon with two primary goals in mind. Firstly, the 
Cambridge scholars wanted to test whether the small size of northwestern European 
households had some effect on Europe’s industrialisation and secondly, they wanted to see 
                                                          
3 For an excellent discussion of the misrepresentation of bride age in modern literature see Chapter 4 of “The 
World We Have Lost” by Peter Laslett, 1965.  
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whether “the liberal political theory which emerged in seventeenth-century England was 
related both with the political theory which it r eplaced and with the actual structure of the 
society which gave its birth” (Laslett, 1972). 
This decision by the Cambridge group to focus on the size and structure of nuclear families 
rather than building on Hajnal’s EMP work fundamentally changed the course of which all 
subsequent work in this field would follow (Hartman, 2004).  By the time Hajnal’s work had 
been published in 1965, the Cambrigde group had already launched their study and although 
their final text (Household and Family In Past Time, 1972) does cite Hajnal in the 
bibliography there is no real discussion of the European Marriage Pattern in the text. It seems 
like Laslett and the Cambridge scholars never took seriously the implications of Hajnal’s 
results until after he actually visited Cambridge later in the 1970’s. 
Instead, the group’s main results confirm the dominance of nuclear household formation in 
preindustrial Europe. The study succeeded in challenging the prevailing sociological wisdom 
that multifamily households were actually much larger than nuclear ones. They found that in 
pre-modern contexts both household types usually contained just 4-6 people, but for different 
reasons. In the nuclear households of northwestern Europe, large household size was being 
driven by unrelated adolescent servants living with the family, and in multifamily settings 
elsewhere, household size was reduced by the splitting of households at various stages of 
evolution. However, the results of the study were largely inconclusive in determining whether 
or not nuclear households had an effect on economic or political change and the theory that 
the Western family pattern had a cau sal effect on north-western Europe’s path to 
industrialisation as resulting from smaller average household size, seemed refuted.  
The group was also widely criticised for their use of computer-generated data series which 
some argued were not representative of European households over time and space. The group 
addressed these issues a decade later in a second set of comparative essays on family 
structure (1983).  
Later work by scholars in the Cambridge group featured the use of new family reconstruction 
techniques using rich information collected from numerous untapped English parish registers 
as well as for some regions in Europe for which similar information was available between 
1580 and 1837. Most noteworthy among these are E. A. Wrigley, R. S. Davies, J. E. Oeppen, 
& R. S. Schofield, eds. “English Population History from Family Reconstruction, 1580-1837” 
(Cambridge, 1997) and John E. Knodel, “Demographic Behaviour in the Past: A Study of 
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Fourteen German Village Populations in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century” 
(Cambridge, 1988). These studies are the first to offer an overview of the scope of marriage 
ages for males and females, as well as changes in fertility and mortality changes in the pre-
industrial era and validate in more detail than ever before, earlier theories that point to 
marriage as the impetus for demographic shifts.  
Hartman (2004:14) points out that, ironically by the time these results had been published the 
interest in investigations of this nature had largely petered out amongst historical 
demographers and had “long since lost the large and enthusiastic audience of social historians 
that they had enjoyed in the 1970’s and early 1980’s”. Most importantly, however, the 
authors themselves had avoided tackling the more interesting questions about the underlying 
causal relationships. In 1997 the Cambridge scholars presented their final volume of 25 years 
of demographic studies, publicly admitting that the “wider issues linking demographic with 
economic and social change [had] been almost entirely neglected, though they are ultimately 
of greater significance than they attempt to publish the facts on population history” (Wrigley, 
Davies, Oeppen, Schofield, 1997:550).  
Astoundingly, after more than four decades since the detection of the EMP, not John Hajnal, 
nor Peter Laslett, nor any of the demographers from the Cambridge Group for the History of 
Population and Social structure who under Laslett’s leadership advocated the North-western 
European family pattern, endeavoured to discover when or why the pattern appeared in the 
first place or the extent of its effect on E urope’s economic development path (Hartman, 
2004:11). 
2.5 Addressing the causes of the EMP 
It was not until the 2010 publication by De Moor and van Zanden that new interest in these 
old questions was reignited. For the first time, an attempt at providing an explanation for the 
emergence of the EMP was formally presented. While their account remains tentative in 
many of its core arguments, it does provide an incredibly valuable point of departure from 
which new work on the subject can take root.   
Their argument for the emergence of the EMP rests on a  combination of three socio-
economic and ideological factors namely (i) the shift towards consensus instead of parental 
authority for the formation of a marriage, (ii) the position of women in the transfer of 
property between husband and wife and between parents and children and (iii) the 
accessibility to, and the size of, the labour market (De Moor & van Zanden, 2010:4). 
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Their first motivation builds on the idea alluded to but never fully qualified by Hajnal, that 
focuses on t he power relationships between spouses when entering into marriage.  In the 
early middle ages marriage was a somewhat rudimentary institution, constituted merely by 
the “handing over of a girl, by her father, to the groom, the exchanging of gifts, and perhaps 
the girl’s deduction in domum, her being brought into the house of the groom or the family” 
(Biller quoted in De Moor & van Zanden, 2010:5).  This definition of marriage slowly began 
to change as the Church took over responsibility for defining marriage.  As De Moor and van 
Zanden highlight, the emergence of the EMP in North-western Europe coincided with the 
evolution of Roman Catholic doctrine that emphasised consent by both spouses rather than 
marriages that were formed against the wishes of both partners.  
This argument suggests that as a result of this changing definition of marriage and the 
equalizing effect this had on the relative power status of consenting spouses, the bargaining 
power of women within marriages became stronger.  Women were for the first time able to 
have some say in who they would eventually marry and parents of young couples had less 
and less authority to control the unions of their children. The power of the male household 
head in Europe was thus significantly diminished in comparison with other truly patriarchal 
societies at the time4 .  
Those who would criticise this explanation typically argue that the emergence of the EMP 
cannot be explained by the Catholic Church’s doctrine on m arriage practices because the 
EMP arose in north-western Europe while other parts of Europe that were equally subject to 
Catholicism retained strong patriarchal family arrangements and non-EMP traits. While De 
Moor and van Zanden acknowledge the importance of this argument, they maintain the fact 
that the EMP ultimately dominated marriage throughout all of Western Europe west of an 
imaginary line from St Petersburg to Trieste that roughly corresponded with the presence of 
the Catholic Church in Medieval times is unlikely to be entirely coincidental. They concede 
however, that critics of this argument are correct in pointing out that other factors must have 
determined the origin of the EMP in north-western Europe, particularly in England and in the 
Low Countries. They therefore turn their attention to factors which they argue could have 
contributed to this formation and that explain why its birth place was the North Sea area. 
                                                          
4 De Moor and Van Zanden refer here to the difference in marriage practices between Europe and China: 
“[Parents] therefore let [children] find their own way in the world and hired other people’s children to do the 
work that in China would have been done by their own children…differences in paternal authority – strong in 
China, weak in Europe-explain why in Europe children were allowed to choose their wedding partner and set up 
their own household”.   
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The first of these factors centres on the transfer of property between generations and within 
households that distinguished north-western Europe from the South, specifically a woman’s 
right to inherit and the ability to transfer property to and through women from husbands or 
relatives. De Moor and van Zanden stress the importance of timing for this kind of transfer to 
take place, noting that although there were many differences within Europe, brides and 
grooms both had property rights in their union and marriage played an important role in 
woman’s right to access her inheritance: “...the bulk if the daughter’s share of the inheritance 
was either transferred to her at the start of her marriage, in the form of a dowry, or at her 
parents’ death” (2010:8). They note that inheritance upon marriage was more common in the 
South of Europe, while inheritance upon the death of one’s parents was more prevalent in the 
North. In short intergenerational property transfer was more detached from marriage in the 
north than in the south.  
De Moor and van Zanden argue that this difference in property transfer legislation in the 
north meant that women faced a different set of incentives that prompted them to increase 
their economic activities during their marriage, knowing that they had the ability to contribute 
towards the marital fund and could benefit financially from its appreciation. In addition, 
women in the north could enjoy certain financial benefits after marriage allowing for better 
opportunities for widows to start new businesses and potentially find new partners. This is 
contrasted with the incentives faced by women in the south whose personal wealth was 
essentially predetermined in spite of any economic activities they might have taken on during 
the marriage.  
While the authors remain cautious about the kind of causal claims that can be made regarding 
the effects of property right customs on m arriage patterns, they assert that there is almost 
certainly a relationship between the two: “If a woman had a right to her parent’s inheritance 
without having to marry, there was no f inancial incentive for marriage. In contrast, the 
Southern dowry system created incentives for both parents and girls to arrange early 
marriages” arguable making it a far more paternal regime (2010:9). For these women, their 
share of the estate was in the form of a dowry (which would return to the wife in the event of 
her husband’s death), the size of which was determined entirely by her family’s financial 
status and willingness to support her, allowing for considerable control over her choice of 
marriage partner and marriage age by her parents.  Furthermore, there was no incentive for 
these women to engage in any economic activities before the marriage that might make them 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 
 
a more attractive to a prospective partner – a more common occurrence among their northern 
counterparts who could afford to wait before marriage.  
Age at marriage also plays an important role here, since in the southern system a younger 
bride would have been easier to “sell” in the marriage market: “Her parents would have to 
pay a larger dowry to compensate the groom’s household for the smaller net positive 
contribution the bride would provide in the marital household...the younger the bride, the 
larger her net positive contribution to the marital household and therefore, the smaller the 
dowry her parents had to pay” (2010:10). In short, the south saw younger brides, earlier 
motherhood and less active participation of young women in the labour market as a result of 
the set of financial incentives designed by the more patriarchal system of property transfer 
rights.  
The final and most fundamental explanation that De Moor and van Zanden offer builds on 
this notion of access to the labour market. While the abovementioned aspects of society, 
namely, consensus versus paternal authority and the distinction between property right 
customs, in all likelihood contributed to the spread of the EMP, the impetus for its 
establishment is ultimately fuelled by an exogenous shock namely, large population declines 
resulting from the Black Death after 1348.  
This is not to say that prior to 1348 l abour markets did not exist anywhere in Europe. All 
evidence suggests that well-developed labour markets already existed in some parts of 
Europe in which a substantial part of the population was employed in the late medieval 
period. However, the implications of the Black Death on t he working age population 
(approximately 1.5 million people out of an estimated total of 4 million people died from the 
disease between 1348 and 1350 in England), resulted in a rising labour market with an 
increasing demand for both male and female labour resulting in sharp increases in real wages, 
particularly for women. This caused an increase in women’s earnings with the result that in 
some cases women were paid the same as men for the same kind of work.  
De Moor and van Zanden suggest that the increased access to employment after the Black 
Death and the bourgeoning labour market for women played a critical role in fostering a 
unique set of conditions under which EMP-characteristics could flourish.  
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2.6 Concluding Remarks 
De Moor and van Zanden suggest that the EMP emerged from the unique power balances 
between husband and wife and between parents and children which differed significantly 
from traditional family relations elsewhere in the world at the same time. They argue that 
“the traditional inequalities between the sexes and the generations are caused by 
socioeconomic, ideological, and institutional factors” and “as women ha[d] a relatively large 
say in the marriage itself (as it is based on the consent of both spouses)—specifically when 
the women contributed to the income of their households, the particular features of the 
EMP—late and non-universal marriage—are the result of its relatively ‘democratic’ 
character”.  
 
This study will echo the strategy of De Moor and van Zanden’s paper that suggests that the 
uniqueness of the more general features of the EMP are best displayed when contrasted with 
marriage patterns elsewhere in the world for the same time period. They do this by comparing 
EMP results to that of marriage patterns in China, but whether this is the most appropriate 
region given the nature of the comparison is debatable. Europe and China are culturally 
irreconcilable. That is to say, in the fundamental societal institutions of organised religion, 
class structure and property rights, the two differ greatly. It is questionable whether the EMP 
ought to be compared with China at all, given that in all likelihood, underlying cultural 
differences could conceal the distinct features of the EMP.  
 
This paper compares a more culturally similar society. The Cape Colony provides an 
experiment in which we can view Europeans of the same cultural upbringing, constrained by 
similar laws governing their daily lives and divided by comparable class barriers to those 
found in Europe. It creates an opportunity to test De Moor and van Zanden’s three hypotheses 
for the underlying causes of the EMP. If valid, when confronted with similar social 
institutions namely, consensus versus paternal authority in the formation of marriage; distinct 
property rights governing the transfer of property between parents and children and between 
husbands and wives; and the access to and size of the labour market, particularly the 
involvement of women in the labour market; the Cape Colony ought to display a similar 
emergence of EMP-like marriage patterns.  Where these institutions do hol d but marriage 
patterns differ, new explanations must be sought. 
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Using genealogical records to track the ancestry of colonial settlers in South Africa the 
following chapter will focus on the evolution of marriage in the Cape Colony for the period 
1652-1850. It will look primarily at the persistence of the EMP and attempt to determine 
whether it continued to characterise the marriages of European descendents outside of 
Europe, or whether a distinct marriage pattern emerged in the Cape Colony in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
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Chapter 3: Cape Colony Marriage in Perspective 
 
3.1 A unique colonial case study 
What sets South Africa’s economic history apart from similar colonial settlements, according 
to Charles Feinstein (2005:1), is its unique endowment of human and natural resources. Other 
societies typically possess one or two of the factors that Feinstein stresses are so important in 
creating a developing societ. South Africa, he argues,  possessed all three, the combination of 
which proved to be particularly valuable. These factors are (i) the presence of a large 
indigenous population, which in the case of South Africa was embodied by Khoisan and 
African natives that already occupied the Southern tip of Africa prior to the arrival of any 
European colonists, (ii) the mounting presence, from the nineteenth century in particular, of a 
large and increasing European settler population and (iii) rich mineral resource deposits 
particularly gold and diamonds, discovered in late nineteenth century, prior to which the 
economy depended almost entirely on agriculture with large parts of the country lacking 
adequate rainfall and other requirements for successful farming.  
With such a unique historical endowment, it is astonishing that little empirical investigation 
into the demographic characteristics of European settlers in the Cape exists (Cilliers & 
Fourie, 2012).  All of the empirical evidence on Cape Colony Marriage patterns (often cited 
in South African historian’s accounts of Cape Colony societal development) currently stems 
from two studies. The first is the pioneering work of Robert Ross (1975) entitled The ‘White’ 
Population of South Africa in the Eighteenth Century and the second is The Anatomy of a 
Colonial Settler Population: Cape Colony 1657-1750 by Leonard Guelke (1988). Ross and 
Guelke differ in their choice of primary data: Guelke makes use of the annual opgaaf, or the 
census of the Cape Colonial population, while Ross makes use of those individuals who were 
assessed for opgaaf  and also appeared in the second edition of C. C. de Villiers’s volumes of 
genealogies entitled Geslags-registers van Ou Kaapse Families as well as those included in J. 
A. Heese’s Die Herkoms van die Afrikaner.  
Perhaps due to limitations in their respective data sources these demographic estimates are 
only calculated from settlement in 1652 until the mid eighteenth century (1760 in Ross’s 
study and 1750 i n Guelke’s study). Little is known about what marriage looked like for 
typical settlers in the latter part of the eighteenth century or nineteenth century and how 
events over these centuries might have affected the way in which households were formed.  
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The aim of this chapter is, firstly, to provide an overview of the results of Ross and Guelke’s 
studies (these will hereafter be referred to as the benchmark results) together with a 
discussion of the implications of these marriage patterns on early settler life. Secondly, I will 
provide the necessary expansion, both in size and scope of the benchmark results using the 
latest genealogical registers as primary data source. Estimates of age at first marriage for 
male and female settlers for the eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, using a dataset far 
greater than used by either of the benchmark studies will be calculated.  
3.2 European heritage, religion and social structure 
Notions of marriage, including the characteristics individuals might consider in their choice 
of spouse and decisions about family life and size amongst European settlers at the Cape, had 
to have derived from the cultural and religious practices of VOC employees’ homelands. 
Distinguishing exactly which customs might have come from which region of a culturally 
heterogeneous Europe, however, is not straightforward. VOC employees arriving at the Cape, 
who would eventually form the bulk of the settler population, typically came from the lowest 
class of North-western European society (Mitchell, 2007:3). 
The end of Thirty Years War in 1648 saw European soldiers and refugees widely dispersed 
across the continent. Immigrants from Germany, Scandinavia, and Switzerland journeyed to 
Holland in the hope of finding employment, often lured by what would today be viewed as 
human trafficking organisations, in the form of crooked boarding house owners in 
Amsterdam (known as seelenverkäufers or soul-sellers), who worked as labour recruiters for 
the VOC: 
Commonly impoverished migrants to the city found that the only alternative to 
starvation was to enjoy the hospitality of such individuals who in turn recouped their 
investments by selling the labour of their unsuspecting guests to the VOC (Dooling, 
2007:18).  
Beyond this, the company filled its ranks with farm labourers, artisans, and unskilled workers 
from both rural and urban areas who spoke a number of variations of French, Dutch, German 
and Scandinavian languages. Soldiers were contractually obliged to remain in the 
employment of the Company for a minimum of five years excluding the six months that the 
journey could have taken and were not permitted to return home during this time (Kearney, 
n/d.:2) 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
In their well-known account of the Shaping of South African Society, Richard Elphick and 
Hermann Giliomee (1989:524) raise the question as to whether ideas or institutions imported 
from the Netherlands could have played an influential role in the development of South 
African society. They suggest that similar to other imperial powers of the day, the Dutch 
believed themselves to be culturally and religiously superior to the rest of the world 
possessing a type of ingrained ‘cultural chauvinism’. Scholars of comparative race relations 
believe that the Dutch and English, who were the chief colonizing powers in South Africa, 
“moved beyond the spiritual unity of medieval Catholicism and the ordered hierarchy of 
feudalism, into the ferment of early capitalism, and hence that their populations had become 
more individualistic and more mobile, and their institutions more egalitarian and democratic” 
(Elphick & Giliomee, 1989:525).  
According to Elphick and Giliomee colonial life was not made up of multifaceted social 
stratification but was characterized by a distinct cleavage in the population, namely, the 
hardworking citizens and the poor whom they detested. In most colonies, it is suggested that 
this type of ‘bifurcation’ became institutionalised into a two-tiered society in which 
Europeans dominated the rest. However, historians have generally emphasised religion rather 
than racism as the shaping force of societal inequalities in the Cape Colony. The VOC 
mandated Protestantism (although it also accepted Lutherans) amongst its employees and it is 
suggested that amongst Calvinists nearly all believed that Christian Europe was superior to 
members of any other race. In a discussion of the potential role religion may have played in 
South Africa’s legacy of racial discrimination, Patterson (1953) argues that: 
It would seem that primitive Calvinism, as modified by two centuries of increasing 
isolation and dispersion, and the imported and increasingly ingrained habit of slave-
owning played a particularly important role in the ordering of attitudes and 
relationships…and in fostering the development of a bi-racial white/non-white society 
instead of the more flexible, pluralistic one imported from the Far East. 
Elphick and Giliomee question the extent to which Calvinism shaped early life at the Cape. 
They argue that the distinction between Calvinism versus Catholicism in terms of the 
emphasis placed on exclusivity with reference to non-European individuals is not clear. That 
is, Calvinist missionaries at the Cape did not prohibit intermarriage nor did they place less 
emphasis on the “equality of persons before God”. Furthermore, they argue, it is not clear as 
to how deeply Calvinism actually permeated society at the Cape or in which regions, classes, 
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and forms it became dominant. They suggest that it has not yet concretely been shown that 
Calvinism had any real impact on l ife at the Cape before 1830, d espite the inclination to 
assume that there would have been a higher level of Calvinist influence in the “pious” 
seventeenth century when most immigrants were from Holland or Huguenots from France 
fleeing to escape religious persecution. They conclude that it was the VOC rather than the 
Church that shaped Cape society at the outset, by “creating distinctive legal status groups that 
remained in place until the 1820’s and 1830’s” namely, Company servants; freeburghers; 
slaves; and ‘Hottentots” or Khoisan (Elphick & Giliomee, 1989:529)  
Within the population of free settlers a vast disparity in wealth characterised the Cape. 
Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell (1983:265) argue that as early as the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, a “small, wealthy, economically active and politically powerful landed 
gentry” held the majority of wealth and controlled the authorities. Wayne Dooling (2007) 
qualifies the use of the term gentry stating that while the term typically denotes a society 
fractured along class divisions, in the Cape, these cleavages were reduced by ties of 
patronage, kinship and marriage:  
A most important aspect of community life was the circulation of land and wealth. In 
this regard, Cape landlords constructed a durable political economy in which the 
rules governing the circulation of land and wealth were defined in community and 
family terms, not dictated by an informal market over which they had little control. 
Although slaveholders had of necessity to participate in a market economy, it was 
their membership of a moral community that protected them against the sometimes 
detrimental consequences of participation in that economy.  
Otto Mentzel (1944:98), a resident of the Cape Colony between 1732 and 1740 provides a 
useful typology to describe the different class structures that evolved within the free burgher 
population at the Cape. He divides the Cape’s settler population into four classes. The first he 
calls the wealthy “absentee-landlords” who mostly lived in Cape Town. These men enjoyed a 
very comfortable life and did not partake in the day-to-day management of their many 
estates. Instead they employed knechten (white labourers) who cared for their rural properties 
which they would frequent only once or twice a year.   
A second class of settlers consisted of landlords who resided on their farms and were largely 
responsible for the production that would supply the Cape Town market. They possessed 
‘excellent farms, paid for and lucrative’. These individuals produced more than their 
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subsistence needs and lived ‘like a gentry’. Many employed knechten but for the most part 
they personally oversaw production on their estates.  
The third class were the hardworking farmers who laboured alongside their slaves. All 
members of such households, including women and children participated in agricultural 
production. Such a farmer was ‘both master and knecht’. Lastly there were the poorer stock 
farmers of the far interior. Estate inventories of arable farmers from the middle of the 
eighteenth century confirm such disparities of wealth (Fourie, 2012).  
Dooling (2007:162) expands the work of Guelke and Shell, with the aim of better defining 
this so-called Cape landed gentry in greater historical detail that had previously been 
achieved. He concludes that the Cape’s elite can be classified as a gentry for the following 
reasons: (i) in line with Mentzel’s description of the first class of settlers, they took active 
control over agricultural production on their farms by personally commanding their slave 
labour force; (ii) by controlling local branches of law and power, these elite were aware of 
their superiority in relation to the rest of the population, particularly the poorer settlers, and as 
a result they monopolized rule over the countryside; (iii) despite commitment to the partible 
inheritance system a great degree of landed stability existed within particular localities from 
the middle of the eighteenth century to the time of slave emancipation.  
Van Duin and Ross (1987:88), however, have long since been opposed to the notion of 
classifying the Cape’s elite as landed gentry. They concede that it is theoretically possible 
that the general increase in wealth in the colony from the slow and steady expansion of 
agricultural production could have been limited to a small group of wealthy landed gentry 
and admit that it has concretely been shown that the distribution of wealth between the rich 
and poor farmers was very wide. Nevertheless, they maintain indications are clear that the 
holding of property remained widely spread in the Colony and argue that this did not result in 
the development of a small group of very rich men monopolising production in the colony: 
In 1814 although eleven men owned six or more farms, 73% of Cape farms were in 
the possession of individuals whose only agrarian property it was. (Van Duin & Ross, 
1987:88). 
Van Duin and Ross’s argument is more compatible with a view which sees a large number of 
Cape farmers as enterprising agrarian capitalists, who were increasingly demanding in their 
place in the government of a colony in which they were the dominant, but not the ruling class 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
(Van Duin & Ross, 1987:88). This debate goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
crucial that the importance of class structure, the degree of inequality between citizens and 
property rights and transfer legislation not be overlooked in an investigation of how marriage 
patterns evolved at the at the Cape and the importance of the role of women in the 
intergenerational transfer of property that allowed for the making of a stable landed class. 
3.3 Early Cape marriage customs  
Social networks established through marriage at the Cape were mostly local, limited to within 
the colony rather than across international boundaries under the greater imperial umbrella. 
Local marriages among the elite often reflected European connections particularly among the 
French Huguenots who immigrated as a group. These unions mirrored the types of household 
systems present in Europe. A case can be made for European families who, while honouring 
connections to their mother country, made marriage alliances within local networks 
demonstrating the “importance of local kinship in creating Cape colonial identity that 
differentiated settlers from indigenous Africans and Asian slaves” (Mitchell, 2007:1). 
The original free population of the Cape Colony was largely sustained by the immigration of 
bachelors (VOC company men). Marrying into indigenous elite families was not practiced in 
the Cape as it w as in Southeast Asian settlements for example and familial marriage 
connections only began to take root by the time the first-born Cape generation reached 
marriageable age. Mitchell (2007:4) stresses though that “family networks, endogamy and 
repeated affinial marriage” practices were established as early as the second generation of 
settlers and persisted throughout the eighteenth century.  
The early government at the Cape believed that a prerequisite for a s table colony was the 
establishment of a large number of married farmers with large families, as opposed to a high 
number of bachelors. Under the leadership of Commander Simon van der Stel, there was an 
early attempt made to transport Dutch orphan girls to the Cape. While they did succeed in 
shipping a handful of girls from Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the immigration of young men in 
to Cape was much larger than that of young girls. Despite the efforts of the Political Council 
there were too few women of marriageable age in the Cape (Biewenga, 1999:211). Ross 
notes that in 1713 the sex ratio stood at 180 adult men to 100 adult women.  
This deficit of suitable marriage partners was no doubt felt by the young men themselves who 
struggled to find brides. According to Guelke’s calculations (1988:463) approximately one-
third of all adult men in the 1705 census never married. This unbalanced sex ratio also meant 
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that women were more likely to remarry than men.  The greatest imbalance of the sexes was 
found in the frontier districts where there were 227 men for every 100 women. Cape Town 
and the immediate surroundings were slightly less extreme, having 174 settler men for every 
100 settler women in Cape Town and 193 men to 100 w omen in the surrounding rural 
district5.  
Inter-group marriage was also not uncommon6. The 1705 census shows that 9 white settler 
men (3.6 percent of all married men) married free black wives. The fact that these unions 
were officially recorded is important because they demonstrate a society that was prepared to 
legitimize marriage between whites and free blacks. It is very likely that there were many 
more unrecorded “illegitimate” relationships between white men and women of other races 
including free blacks, Khoisan and slave women.  
Even so, Ross (1999:28) reports that knechten found it difficult to marry into farming 
families. He cites the rather dismal tale of Class van Mook, a knecht living and working on 
the farm of one Hendrik Neef near Riebeek-Kasteel in the Swartland district. Claas 
approached his employer asking for his step-daughter, Catherine Knoetsen’s hand in 
marriage. Neef allegedly forbid the union admitting that he would have allowed it if Claas 
had come from a family of standing: “Neen…aan jou niet, maar dat je een boeren seun was, 
dan wel.”  Tragically, this ended in an altercation in which Neef was killed and for which 
Claas was executed. This is just one infamous case in which marriage could not triumph over 
entrenched class divisions and Ross concedes that there were many knechten who in spite of 
these prejudices married happily into farming families.  
It is crucial to note, however, that neither the early years of settlement, when choice of 
marriage partner may have been somewhat limited due to population size, nor later in the 
eighteenth century, when the size of the European settler population had expanded rapidly 
due to high birth rates and ongoing immigration, did home language or religious 
denomination appear to have defined marriage patterns at the Cape. Mitchell (2007:3) 
emphasizes that choice of spouse rested on reasons other than place of origin or theological 
                                                          
5 Guelke’s estimates do not include the non-settler white population of white farm servants (knegts) and 
Company personnel. The addition of these groups he suggests would substantially increase the imbalance 
between sexes in the white population. 
6 For a detailed account of inter-group and inter-racial marriage at the Cape from 1652 to 1795 see H.F. Heese’s 
Groep Sonder Grense (2005). 
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persuasion and marriage across class divisions was more acceptable in the Cape than it might 
have been in Europe: 
Thus endogamy, rather than being used to create or sustain a narrow elite, was 
instead a component of a more general settler identity that embraced landed gentry, 
middling stock farmers and households of modest means. 
3.4 Huguenot marriage  
The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by Louis XIV banning Protestantism in 
France resulted in a large number of French Huguenots fleeing to Holland where Protestants 
remained protected.  Since Holland would not be able to accommodate such a large number 
of individuals on a permanent basis, the VOC saw the situation as an opportunity to relocate a 
number of Huguenot refugees to the Cape where it was hoped that their practical skills (such 
skills as were lacking in the Colony) of wheat farming, olive growing, wine and brandy 
making and cattle rearing, could be put to productive use in the still sparsely settled 
community7.  
Huguenots wishing to immigrate to the Cape would only be accepted by the VOC on t he 
condition that they would become settler farmers. The VOC’s main motive behind this 
naturalisation was to prevent Huguenots from becoming an autonomous group, with the kind 
of political liberties they had previously enjoyed in France and ultimately avert them from 
establishing their own “state within a state” (Wijsenbeek, 2007:97). Thus between 1688 and 
1700, approximately one hundred and seventy French Huguenot refugees arrived at the Cape 
with little more than the clothes on their backs, and in line with most VOC agreements were 
required to stay for at least five years (Hunt, 2005:136).  
Huguenots were not only supplied with a free ticket to the Cape and stipend according to 
their circumstances, but were provided upon arrival at the Cape with as much land as they 
could cultivate and any farming equipment, seed or cattle they might require and a sum of 
money on credit which they were allowed to repay in kind, in the form of vegetables, fruit, 
grain, meat and wine. “This type of repayment was most convenient to the Company, always 
intent on ensuring the revictualling of its fleet and afraid of running short of indispensable 
produce” (Kearney, n/d:3). 
                                                          
7 Fourie & Von Fintel (2011) show that the specialised wine-making skills of the Huguenots provided the group 
with a sustainable competitive advantage, supporting an explanation of initial and persistent productivity 
differences between settler groups at the Cape.   
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The VOC allegedly had mixed feelings towards the Huguenots at the Cape. Pleased with the 
notion that the colony would benefit from the skills of the new settlers, the Company 
endeavoured to financially assist the essentially destitute Huguenot settlers in the form of 
further financial aid, “but when this extra help and the privileges for the Huguenots caused 
resentments among the other inhabitants of the Cape, the VOC decided in 1700 to officially 
stop the immigration of Huguenots to South Africa” (Wijsenbeek, 2007:98).  
Cultural adaptation took place rapidly since new identities had to be shaped in a settler 
environment. Few Huguenots had worked as farmers in their homeland, so not only did they 
have to adapt to the cultural traditions of the Dutch and German farmers they had been placed 
amongst, but also to a new means of livelihood (Whiting-Spilhaus, 1949:54). The Huguenot 
settlers were initially considered outsiders by the Dutch and German settler population and 
social relations between the groups remained strained until the beginning of the eighteenth 
century.  
At first, French single men vowed never to take Dutch wives and Patricia Romero (2003:32) 
argues that the Huguenots attempted to “cling to their French-ness through marriage and 
naming patterns amongst themselves” and apart from those who were already married upon 
arrival, the majority of Huguenots who did marry took French spouses. But the two groups 
quickly became allied in their struggle against Governor W. A. Van der Stel’s economic 
autocracy (Kearney, n.d:25), and inter-group marriage was not uncommon and could be seen 
as early as first or second marriages. Similar to the rest of the Cape’s settler population, there 
were a number of Huguenot men who never married. Romero suggests that the language 
barrier may have played a role in the prolonged bachelorhood that characterised the Cape but 
cites the shortage of women at the Cape as the main reason. 
Through a systematic study of Huguenot marriage patterns at the Cape, Romero (2003:44) 
hoped to show that daughters of Huguenot refugees were more likely to marry outside of 
their group on t heir first marriage, and if widowed would most likely marry back into the 
French population bringing back any assets they may have accumulated from the first 
marriage. Contrary to her initial suspicions about inter-group marriage trends, she found that 
more daughters of Huguenot refugees actually married out of their group on t heir second 
marriage rather than back in. Moreover, she notes a tendency of siblings to marry into the 
same families as their older sisters or brothers. These marriage strategies were potentially not 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
 
preference-driven but developed rather out of economic and locality motivations due to the 
partible inheritance system at the Cape. 
Both Romero and Mitchell’s work on Huguenot marriage patterns sheds considerable light on 
how closely intertwined inheritance laws and marriage practices were at the Cape. Despite 
the prohibition of marriage between first cousins dictated by Protestant doctrine, the practice 
was very common at the Cape. German- and Dutch-speaking immigrants might have 
accepted the notion of marriage between non-nuclear family members despite admonition by 
the church as it was not thought of as extraordinary in their home countries. More 
importantly, intra-family marriage made sense in the context of a s ystem of partible 
inheritance and appeared to become a dominant marriage strategy amongst families of all 
nationality at the Cape. This marriage strategy as well as the extent to which dynastic 
marriages contributed to the maintenance of the Cape landed gentry will be explored in 
greater detail in the following chapter.  
3.5 Some benchmark results  
Before an attempt to understand the underlying causes of Cape Colony marriage patterns can 
be undertaken, it is first necessary to consolidate existing empirical and anecdotal evidence of 
early marriage pattern at the Cape. The results of Ross and Guelke’s studies show that age at 
first marriage for men was relatively late across all districts. Furthermore Guelke reports that 
men married noticeably later than women, being on average 13 years older than women at 
first marriage. However, this difference was not typically as simple as a 3 0 year old man 
marrying a 17 year old girl: 10 to 30 per cent of men married widows who were considerably 
older than themselves. In fact, widows often married men who had not yet been married 
before and were approximately the same age or younger than themselves. But widowers were 
more likely to marry women who had never been married before than to marry widows. In 
these cases the age differences could have been beyond twenty years.   
 
Table 5 shows Guelke’s age at first marriage estimates for 1705 and 1731 by sex and district. 
The estimates reported by Ross on t he other hand differ notably from Guelke’s, the main 
reason being that Ross includes free blacks as part of the ”white” population. The age at first 
marriage for men in Ross’s sample is just over 25 years which he admits may be considered 
low. Table 6 shows Ross’s estimates of age at first marriage for men by age of wife.  
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Table 5: Age at marriage of first-time married settlers at the Cape 
  Males Females 
 
1705 1731 1705 1731 
District Age N Age  N Age N Age N 
         Cape Town 32.7 14 28.1 36 18 21 19.3 63 
Rural 28.8 25 27.4 124 16.8 34 18.8 122 
Frontier 30.3 24 25.4 47 17 25 18.6 57 
         Colony 30.2 63 27.1 207 17.2 80 18.5 242 
Note: Table is based on adults who were married at the time of the census for the first time 
Source: Guelke, L. 1988. Pg. 463.  
 
Table 6: Age of husbands by age of wives at first marriage at the Cape, before 1760 
Age of wife 
No. of 
husbands 
older 
No. of 
husbands 
younger 
Mean age of 
husbands 
Median age 
of husbands 
Mean age 
difference 
between 
spouses* 
Under 20 85 6 25.2 23.5 93 
20-24 32 15 25.3 24.9 33 
25-29 3 7 23.9 22.6 -48 
Over 30 1 8 26.9 24.6 -114 
Total 121 36 25.3 23.1 66 
*Age in months. Positive values indicate that the husband was older 
Source: Ross (1975:224) 
     
There was considerable pressure on girls to marry young, the result being that teen marriage 
amongst females was very common. Guelke reports age 15 as the mode for first marriage for 
females in the 1705 census; 18 as the mean in Cape Town; 16.8 in the Rural District; and 
17.0 in the frontier district. Ross’s estimates for women’s age at first marriage appear to be 
closer in line with Guelke’s, reporting a mean age for women of 21 and a median age of 19 
years and six months at first marriage.  
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These estimates are in line with the general impression of life at the Cape for this early 
period. According to the Chief Archivist for the Union of South Africa: 
At the Cape the increase was numerically greater than was usual in other parts of the 
world. It was quite common for girls of fifteen or sixteen and young men a few years 
older to marry and have a family of ten or fifteen. These early marriages made the 
women look at least ten years older than their European sisters, and before middle 
age made them stout, a characteristic noticed in a number of Cape ladies (Botha, 
1926:41-44). 
Marriages in this early period were relatively stable. For settler men, first marriages lasted 
23.3 years on average and there was little difference in mean marriage lengths between Cape 
Town and its surroundings; however males from the frontier Drakenstein had longer 
marriages with a mean length of 25 years. Interestingly, these estimates were not contingent 
on the end of the marriage being due to the death of the husband or the wife. Guelke reports 
that mean marriage lengths for marriages that ended as a result of the death of the husband or 
as a result of the death of the wife were identical. Table 7 presents Guelke’s findings on the 
marriage stability of first-time married settlers. 
 
Table 7: Length of marriage of first-time married settlers 
 
  Males Females 
District 1705 1731 1705 1731 
  
Marriage 
Length  N 
Marriage 
Length  N 
Marriage 
Length  N 
Marriage 
Length  N 
Cape 
Town 23.1 15 21.4 53 21.3 11 27.3 17 
Rural 22.2 43 27 89 21.7 25 25.5 43 
Frontier 25 31 25.3 35 23.9 10 21.1 12 
         Colony 23.3 89 25 177 22.1 46 25.1 72 
Source: Guelke, L. (1988: 466). 
Ross too highlights the fact that remarriage of both widows and widowers was common, 
swift and more frequent among men than women, citing the potential effects of higher 
mortality among women given the dangers of childbirth and the absence of male deaths in 
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war; as well as the possibility that middle aged men were more likely to be able to find a 
suitable marriage partner than a woman of the same age (although this seems unlikely given 
the unbalanced sex ratio and the frequency of older women marrying younger men is 
recorded). Table 8 shows that women who married immigrants were more likely to remarry 
than those who did not.  
Table 8: Remarriage rates at the Cape before 1760 
  No. 
No. 
remarrying 
Proportion 
remarrying 
Women marrying immigrants 95 21 22% 
Women not marrying immigrants 201 33 16% 
Total women 296 54 18% 
Men immigrants 82 18 22% 
Men non-immigrants 173 35 20% 
Total men 255* 53 21% 
*The number of men included is smaller than the number of women as only those 
men whose marriage to women in the sample was their first were included.  
Source: Ross (1975:225) 
    
Guelke reports that second and third marriages accounted for 4.2 percent of adult males and 
14.7 percent of adult females. Widows were therefore more pressured to remarry with the 
result that most remarried within 2 years of husband’s death while widowers typically re-
married between 2-3 years after wife’s death. However, there were also a number of widows 
who did not remarry. Guelke and Ross both suggest that remarriage patterns were more 
affected by the imbalanced sex-ratios than by life-expectancy differences between genders8.  
3.6 New data sources 
This chapter now addresses the need for the expansion of the existing knowledge about Cape 
Colony marriage patterns beyond the mid-eighteenth century. This study makes use of a 
similar data source, namely genealogical registers of European settlers at the Cape, but on a 
far greater scale than has been attempted before. 
Historical demography estimates often provide an essential point of departure upon which the 
reconstruction of socio-economic circumstances can take place. Paradoxically, historical 
                                                          
8 Guelke’s life span estimates for the period are provided in Appendix A. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
 
records tend to have more complete and reliable quantitative information about birth, death 
and marriage in the past than about prices or production, the more traditionally used indices 
for measuring standards of living and welfare (Wrigley 1969). With the family regarded as 
the most universal of all institutions it is natural that it forms the basic unit of demographic 
analysis. Genealogical records are therefore a fitting data source for a study that aims to 
investigate marriage patterns in a historical context.  
This study uses the 1986 edition of Heese’s new genealogical registers published by the 
Genealogical Institute of South Africa (2008), which contains complete family registers of all 
settler families from 1652 to approximately 1830 as well as those of new progenitors of 
settler families up to 1867.  Consequently, the dataset created for this research allows for the 
calculation of historical demographic estimates from a s ample size far larger than has ever 
been attempted using South African data. 
 
The new series is compiled from the baptism and marriage records of the Dutch Reformed 
Church archives in Cape Town. Where possible, this was supplemented with information 
gathered from marriage documents of the courts of Cape Town, Graaff-Reinet, Tulbagh, 
Colesberg which was collected from a card index in the Cape Archives Depot. Much of the 
information was also obtained from death notices in the estate files of Cape Town and 
Bloemfontein. Information was also taken from published works of inter alia D.F. du T oit 
Malherbe: Family register of the South African nation (1966), I. Mitford-Barberton: Some 
frontier families (1968) and various genealogies on i ndividual families. The new GISA 
dataset9 covers 14,048 families with information on 401,602 individuals between 1652 and 
2007.  
 
Mistakes inevitably crop up in work involving information that was collected from various 
sources and which was then rewritten several times before publication. In the compilation of 
the South African Genealogies, many of the original documents were also lost, errors 
sometimes occurred in the documents themselves, and in others writing was faded, indistinct 
and sometimes almost illegible. In the full data set of 401,602 e ntries there are 139,739 
entries that are complete in terms of a birth date and baptism date. By calculating the average 
interval between the birth date and baptism date of these individuals, it becomes clear that on 
                                                          
9 See Cilliers & Fourie (2012) for a more detailed description of the data sources and the data capturing process. 
An excerpt is provided in Appendix B. 
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average, individuals were baptized within the first year of their lives. Accordingly, in cases 
where the birth date of an individual is omitted in the registers, we have used the individual’s 
baptism date as a proxy for their birth. 
 
Before any estimates of marriage age can be undertaken a number of potential data concerns 
must be addressed. The first questions the representativeness of the GISA data of the actual 
historical population. While the registers are complete up until 1869, i t does contain 
information on i ndivuals up unt il 2007. T his information only exists, however, where 
families have taken it upon themselves to keep information on their family trees up to date 
with record keepers at the South African Genealogical Institute. This calls into question the 
representativeness of the registers after 1867, since we cannot know what kind of a bias this 
kind of self selection into the registers could create. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the 
sample size with estimates of the total population over the period10. The close correlation 
between the sample and total population of the eighteenth century has already weakened by 
the mid-nineteenth century, and growth in the sample slows considerably relative to the total 
population by the turn of the twentieth century.  
 
Secondly, the representativeness of the marriage dummy must be considered. Figure 2 
provides a comparison of the sample size with the presence of a first marriage dummy. There 
is a cl ose correlation between the sample size and the marriage dummy with the marriage 
dummy remaining a relatively fixed proportion of the sample for all periods of interest. As a 
result of the possible bias in the sample after the second half of the nineteenth century, this 
study will only provide estimates up to 1850. While this limits the scope of the analysis that 
can be provided to some extent, the estimates calculated in this chapter still expand on 
existing knowledge of marriage patterns in the Cape by a century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Comparisons are only provided for each year that a population estimate is available. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of sample size and population estimates 
Source: Cilliers and Fourie (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of sample size and marriage dummy 
Source: GISA (2008) 
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A final concern is the unbalanced age–sex ratio of the population as already touched on in the 
overview of early Cape Colony marriage. Hajnal questions how the “overall account might be 
balanced” in a society where almost 100 percent of women marry while there is a surplus of 
females in the population. This is pertinent in the European context where traditionally there 
is a surplus of females with resulting spinsters as a “normal condition, occasionally 
aggravated by war” (Hajnal, 1965:127).  
Hajnal suggests that the ratio of the total number of men to the total number of women in the 
population, while often cited in this context is in actual fact of little importance. What is 
important rather is the ratio of males to females in the population at “prime marriageable 
ages”. He notes at the time of writing (1965) that the situation in England was that women far 
outnumbered men: 
Yet so far as availability for marriage is concerned there is a shortage of women. The 
‘surplus women’ are mainly widows over 60. It is probable that in eighteenth century 
Europe this ratio was much less favourable to women’s chances of marriage than in 
many non-Western populations. There is, of course, always an excess of boys at birth, 
some 105 make births for every 100 female births. Male mortality is heavier than 
female mortality and in eighteenth century Europe the excess of males dying was 
probably sufficient, not only to produce equality of the sexes by the marriageable age, 
but also to create a female surplus (Hajnal, 1965:127).  
Gallman (1984:612) suggests, however, that mean age difference does not necessarily depend 
entirely on societal norms or individuals preferences. He suggests that at the aggregate level, 
an imbalanced sex ratio will affect mean age differences between spouses. In a society where 
men outnumber women, he argues that the competition between brides to find a husband will 
drive brides’ ages down while men will typically marry later or not at all.  
This confirms the results found for the Cape Colony. In the earliest period (1700-1750) for 
which I could create an age-sex distribution for the Cape, men far outnumbered women in 
every age cohort as shown in Figure 3 below. This confirms both Ross and Guelke’s 
unbalanced sex-ratio figures for the early eighteenth century. 
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Figure 3: Gender pyramid by age at death, 1700-1749. 
 Figure 4: Gender pyramids by age at death, 1749-1799. 
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Figure 5: Gender pyramid by age at death, 1800-1849. 
Expanding the existing knowledge of settler demography using the new dataset uncovers that 
from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards; the age-sex ratio of men and women at 
the Cape becomes far more balanced and looks more comparable to the traditional pyramid 
shape that one would expect to see in this kind of distribution as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
The implications of this balancing out of men and women in the Cape is arguably the most 
fundamental contribution this paper offers to the explanation of  t he evolution of marriage 
patterns at the Cape that is posited in the following chapter.   
3.7 New results: expanding our knowledge of settler marriage 
What remains is the task of calculating new marriage age estimates for the Cape up until the 
mid-nineteenth century. The distribution of marriages by age, and the mean age at marriage 
calculated from it, provides perhaps the most natural approach to study marriage given the 
data at hand. In the Cape Colony data, the unhappy task of matching each marriage certificate 
with the baptismal certificates was undertaken by the creators of the South African 
Genealogical Registers. This saved considerable time and effort since calculating age at first 
marriage was now entirely straightforward. A new variable called “age at first marriage” was 
constructed by subtracting individual’s birth or baptism year from the year of first marriage.  
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Table 9 presents the new results calculated by half century periods for the Cape Colony. 
Similar to Guelke’s results for the earliest period, I find that men tended to marry women that 
were significantly younger than themselves, although this trend seems to disappear over time. 
According to Ross’s estimates for the period before 1760 the mean difference in age between 
husband and wife is five years and six months (Ross 1975:224). The new estimates seem to 
largely confirm this result, with a similarly high mean difference in age between spouses for 
the period spanning 1700-1749 of 7 years and 6 months.  
 
Table 9: Summary of new age at first marriage results at the Cape, 1700-1850 
  N 
Mean 
husbands'      
age at 
first 
marriage 
Median 
husbands'     
age at 
first 
marriage 
N 
Mean 
wives’ 
age             
at first 
marriage 
Median 
wives' 
age                            
at first 
marriage 
Mean 
difference 
between 
spouses* 
 
1700-1749 
 
30 
 
30.1 
 
28 
 
30 
 
25.8 
 
20.5 
 
53 
1750-1799 212 28.7 25 207 26.8 24 23 
1800-1849 102 31.8 26 106 28.5 26 39 
        
 *Age in months. Positive values indicate that the husband was older 
 
Mean estimates in this sample appear to overestimate age at first marriage for women, 
particularly in the earliest period where the sample size is very small and is easily biased by 
outliers. The median age at first marriage is perhaps a better indicator of the actual figure as it 
is less subject to interference of outliers, although the general trend in age at first marriage 
which is of most interest can be seen clearly with either measure. For women then, the 
median age at first marriage of 20.5 in the earliest period (1700-1749) is perfectly in line with 
both Ross’s median estimate of 19.6 and mean estimate of 21.0 for women born around 1730 
and slightly higher than Guelke’s estimate of 18.5 for all districts in 1731. These early 
estimates also seem to be in line with the general impression of family life in the Cape. 
According to Chief Archivist for the Union of South Africa and author of Social Life in the 
Cape Colony in the 18th Century: 
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It was rare to find an unmarried lady and for a married woman to have no offspring 
was looked upon almost as a disgrace...Early marriages were the general rule and 
large families averaging twelve were common. The necessaries of life were easily 
obtained at a low cost and the warm climate of the Cape was both healthy and 
pleasant. These factors accounted for early marriages and the increase in offspring 
when each household was owing to the healthy and sober lives of the parents (Botha, 
1926:44).  
Moreover, these results fit perfectly into Hajnal’s non-EMP archetype (typical of pre-
industrial, agriculture based, patriarchal societies) displaying a very young age, particularly 
for brides upon first marriage of around 20.5 (well below 24), a large difference in ages 
between husbands and wives (husbands being on average 7 and a half years older) and near 
universal marriage for women. However, estimates for later periods reveal a s omewhat 
different picture. It would seem that, over time, the Cape Colony has shifted away from the 
non-EMP that clearly characterized it in the first half of the eighteenth century to a pattern 
more closely resembling the EMP from middle of the eighteenth century persisting through to 
the middle of the nineteenth century, displaying a higher age at first marriage, particularly for 
brides as well as a s ignificantly diminished difference in ages between spouses of between 
2½ and 3½ years between 1750 and 1850.  
3.8 Concluding remarks 
I will refer to the distinct marriage pattern that characterizes the Cape after 1750 as a Pseudo-
EMP, as it d isplays all the characteristics of Hajnal’s traditional EMP but appears to have 
originated for different reasons than those cited by De Moor and van Zanden as the most 
likely underlying causes of the EMP. The detection of this Pseudo-EMP at the Cape 
necessarily calls into question the validity of the three De Moor and van Zanden 
hypotheses.The next step in this research is to delve deeper into the three potential causes of 
the EMP, scrutinising them against what is known of Cape Colony society and the Pseudo-
EMP that characterised it.  
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Chapter 4: Revisiting the EMP 
 
After presenting an overview of the EMP which emphasised the need for a better explanation 
of the origins of this unique household formation system and offering the Cape Colony as a 
more appropriate case study against which to contrast the more general features of the EMP, 
the stage has been set to critically evaluate the three De Moor and van Zanden hypotheses of 
the underlying causes of the EMP, namely: (i) consensus versus parental authority in the 
formation of marriages; (ii) property rights and the position of women in the transfer of 
property; and (iii) the size and accessibility of the labour market. 
4.1 Consensus, inheritance and familial marriage strategies at the Cape 
At age twenty John Findlay moved to the small church town of Lady Grey in 1859 to work as 
a trader on the farm Oranjefontein. There he met Katherine Schreiner, the eldest of four 
siblings and daughter of a German missionary Gottlob Schreiner and his wife Rebecca. The 
Schreiner’s had lived a difficult life to say the least, constantly moving from one mission 
station to the next, and living amongst the African community which they so clearly detested. 
In Rebecca’s words her greatest concern was “the difficulty of keeping the children separate 
from the swarthy demon of the house...how difficult it is to live as we do amongst the gross, 
sensual heathen, to preserve that delicacy of thought and feeling so indispensable for a right 
development of the female character”. Throughout their struggles as a family, they were 
upheld by Gottlob’s faith and Rebecca’s determination to raise her children in a devout 
household (Ross, 1999:71).  
Soon after meeting, John and Katherine became engaged, but John’s entry into the family 
was not met with very much enthusiasm by Katherine’s parents.  Her family disliked John’s 
frivolous character and alleged that Katherine’s motive for attaching herself to him was to 
escape the control of her difficult mother and the strict rules which were imposed on her. All 
the same, given the exacting code of morality and racial restrictions the family lived by, John 
may very well have been the first suitable man Katherine had ever come across and she was 
not in a position to pass him or the opportunities he presented up (Ross, 1999:71).  
Her parents, though, were against the union, perhaps as a response to Katherine’s rebellion 
against them but it is not unlikely that they were simply concerned for her future happiness. 
Interestingly, however, her parents seemed most perturbed by their suspicion that Katherine 
had acted in a manner so as to encourage John’s affection, behaviour which was unacceptable 
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for a young lady, particularly a missionary’s daughter. Despite their qualms with John, and a 
few episodes of more serious conflict between John and Gottlob, Katherine’s parents 
eventually informed John that “their daughter was of age, and that, though they would regret 
the marriage, they left her perfectly at liberty to do as she felt fit” (Findlay, 1954:137).  
Gottlob himself presided over the small wedding ceremony between Katherine and John and 
in the years that followed, John financially supported his wife’ family. Sadly, John and 
Katherine’s story is not one that ends happily. Katherine was reportedly miserable in the 
marriage and at times hoped for a divorce but was advised by her mother to “put her faith in 
God’s wisdom despite her unhappiness”. But after losing her fourth of twelve children from 
complications during birth, Katherine reportedly experienced a mental breakdown and was 
forced to live out her final years in an asylum in Pietermaritzburg (Ross, 1999:74). 
In spite of their many misfortunes, the story of John and Katherine is nonetheless one in 
which the decision to marry was taken by the marriage partners themselves, even in the face 
of opposition by the bride’s parents. If this was at all typical behaviour for the time it would 
confirm the hypotheses, firstly, that the majority of men were able to escape from the control 
of their parents at a relatively young age and set up on their own and secondly, that parental 
authority was not the most central feature of unions between young men and women at the 
Cape. 
There is little doubt that the Cape remained a relatively patriarchal society throughout the 
early period, organised around the roles and responsibilities of men in society. The head of 
this patriarchal family was the Boer. In his roles as husband, father, farmer, hunter and 
frontier fighter, he was a rather formidable figure to his children, in particular to his sons, 
with whom he may have experienced some tension until such time as they were married and 
were given their own farms, or journeyed into the frontier to take up new land (Patterson, 
1957:240).   
Even so, there is little evidence of the kind of arranged marriages that De Moor and van 
Zanden cite as common in truly patriarchal societies of the time, in which marriages were 
largely determined by parents whose utility depended on t he marriage outcome of their 
children. Instead, marriage at the Cape appears to have been motivated to a large degree by 
status, and strategic marriages to preserve property within a family were very common. As 
previously alluded to but not yet explore in full, inheritance laws and marriage patterns were 
closely linked at the Cape.  
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While the 1865 Report of the Law of Inheritance Commission for Western Districts states 
that ‘Colonial Law of Marriage has no n ecessary connection with the Colonial Law of 
Inheritance’ it did identify that the ‘consequences of the law of marriage are very generally 
spoken of as consequences of the law of inheritance’ (Walker, 1957:66). The legal system of 
the Cape Colony was based on t he principles of Roman-Dutch Law. This system stressed 
primacy of the rule of law above all else and was recognized for its fastidious attention to 
‘due process, legality and precedent’. Equality before the law, a notion appearing only in the 
later nineteenth century liberal discourse, did not yet exist (Ross, 1993:155).  
Marriages at the Cape were traditionally carried out ‘in community of property’ which 
mandated that any assets brought into the marriage by each partner became joint property. 
The law stated that upon t he death of one’s spouse, the surviving spouse would receive 
between a half and two-thirds share of the estate while the remainder was to be equally 
distributed between the offspring. Heirs, regardless of whether they were male or female, 
were entitled by law to a ‘legitimate portion of the estate’. This traditionally meant that 
children would divide inheritance equally amongst themselves, but more importantly it 
ensured that wills could not be used to disinherit an heir nor be employed to benefit one 
member of the family over another (Guelke, 1989:81).  
However, it appears as if in the early period at least, male heirs were favoured. Dooling 
(2005:155) provides the example of Jan Blignaut, a wealthy land owner, whose sons Jan and 
Pieter were both able to purchase farms from the estate upon his death in 1752. None of his 
three daughters who were all married at the time of his death acquired any fixed property; 
however, his sons-in-law all purchased a number of slaves from the estate.  
Resulting from the Roman-Dutch law of succession, an individual’s estate would most often 
end up being dissolved upon their death.  Dooling (2007:31) argues that this was due to the 
combination of the partible inheritance system together with the fact that settlers tended to 
have large households, so that an individual’s assets, whether they were in the form of land or 
slaves, would be divided up be tween the individual’s widow or widower and their many 
children often resulting in the dispersion of wealth. This fragmentation of large estates was 
one of the primary reasons why the elite class of large-scale slave-owners struggled to grow. 
While more affluent individuals who perhaps owned several farms or slaves could bequeath 
some wealth to their heirs after their passing, the dispersal of property to some degree was an 
unavoidable result: 
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In a family with six children, at the death of a parent, the surviving spouse would 
inherit half the estate and the children would split the other half equally. One-twelfth 
of a farm was not likely to maintain subsistence, let alone be a stepping stone to 
prosperity. If, however, a pair of siblings was to cooperate with siblings from another 
family, an equitable exchange was possible that would put both couples on a better 
footing (Mitchell, 2007:8).   
In spite of the continuing Christian ban against marriage between close relatives, including 
the prohibition of first-cousin marriage advocated by Calvin, there were always exceptions in 
early-modern Europe (Goody, 1983:11). Similarly colonial society at the Cape bent these 
Christian, European norms and as a result, familial unions made up a considerable proportion 
of the recognized marriages at the Cape (Mitchell, 2007:15).  
Inheritance negotiations must therefore have played an important role in marriage decisions 
at the Cape given the frequency with which inter-family marriage between pairs of siblings is 
said to have occurred. Mitchell (2007:8) acknowledges that we may never exactly know to 
what extent young individual’s exercised choice in who they would marry or how 
enthusiastic they were about their situation as settlers in unexplored territories. She suggests 
that whether or not couples made their own plans or to what extent parents had a hand in 
arranging partnerships, the fact that women played some role in creating and sustaining 
relationships challenges Romero’s assertion that patriarchal fathers controlled marriage 
choices. “Women, mothers, aunts, sisters, cousins”, she argues, “linked families across 
landscapes and across generations” (Mitchell, 2007:8).  
Upon British annexation of the Cape it was settled that the existing legal system would be 
maintained. The legal charters of 1828 and 1834 both emphasised that the foundation of the 
law would stay as it was. The South African legal system would therefore remain rooted in 
that of eighteenth-century Netherlands, despite intermittent calls for the introduction of the 
British system (Ross 1999:51). In the nineteenth century, for example, the British 
government attempted to replace the Colony’s existing laws of marriage and inheritance with 
their own, but met with considerable resistance from the landowning classes.  
Dooling (2007:32) cites the case of land owners in the nineteenth century Highveld who 
refused to relinquish the partible inheritance regime. These land owners, he suggests, were 
comparable to the fathers of the American Revolution in their steadfast belief that partible 
inheritance was synonymous with republican virtue, despite the potential risk of their families 
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becoming divorced form their land. British primogeniture, the feudal right of succession 
belonging to the firstborn child, by which the whole real estate of an intestate passed to the 
eldest son, by contrast, represented the ‘customs of the middle ages’: 
When Lord Milner tried to abolish partible inheritance in the Transvaal in the 
aftermath if the South African War, he found implementation difficult as landlords 
remained stubbornly wedded to customary practice (Dooling, 2007:32). 
While the law of succession demanded the division of property amongst those settlers who 
privately owned farms at the Cape; a complex system of land tenure involving loan farms, 
which were in theory leased from the VOC, could not be subdivided. Settlers were prohibited 
from simply dividing up these holdings into smaller and smaller pieces along the lines of the 
division of property necessitated by the partible inheritance system.  On the whole, these 
farms were sold off in their entirety, and generally retained their original size well into the 
nineteenth century. The consequence of such a system meant that landed property at the Cape 
changed hands regularly (Ross, 1993).  
To nineteenth century new British entrants, the Cape’s system of land tenure must have 
seemed disastrous and the records of relatively prosperous settlers show that their concerns 
were not ungrounded: 
Each generation, seemingly, had to build up its holdings anew. British commentators, 
who naturally saw primogeniture as the only means to secure landed stability and 
unhindered capital accumulation, found partible inheritance objectionable wherever 
they went. What such commentators failed to realise, however, was that for many of 
the world’s ancient landed classes, equal division of property upon death had deep 
cultural significance, even if it did threaten landed stability and the continuity of 
lineages (Dooling, 2007:32). 
The purpose of this in-depth discussion of the inheritance system at the Cape is to illustrate 
that the system remained largely the same throughout the period of interest, despite the 
number of regime change. The distinct Pseudo-EMP that evolved at the Cape did so in spite 
of the fact that inheritance legislation remained largely unaltered from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century through to the middle of the nineteenth century. This suggests that 
inheritance legislation and the role of women in the transfer of property may not have the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
kind of effect on the age at which individuals chose to marry posited by De Moor and van 
Zanden.  
That is not to say that these laws did not play any role in the formation of marriage at the 
Cape – all discussion thus far is to the contrary. The system of partible inheritance at the 
Cape no doubt had a major role to play in the marriage strategies of individuals at the Cape as 
demonstrated by the frequency of familial marriage, but it seems to have been more 
influential in determining who an individual would marry rather than when11. 
4.2 The rise of a Cape “Widowarchy” 
De la Croix and Mariani (2012) posit that as soon as economic motives become important in 
society, most powerful and wealthy men will choose to have as many wives as possible and 
enjoy larger reproductive success. Following the medieval spread of Christianity, however, it 
became almost impossible for men to concurrently father different children from multiple 
women, and remarriage was only possible after widowhood. Strict monogamy was therefore 
progressively institutionalized and enforced and is confirmed by the deterioration of the 
status of illegitimate children in society. More recently, the introduction of divorce and the 
possibility of remarriage has driven the transition from monogamy to what De la Croix and 
Mariani (2012:1) have coined serial monogamy: an institutional setting in which men can 
again have children with different women (and vice versa) but not simultaneously.  
According to De la Croix and Mariani (2012:2), serial monogamy essentially started off as an 
intertemporal version of polygamy, in which divorce was usually initiated by men. In contrast 
the Cape appears to have been home to a different brand of serial monogamy that was driven 
by the death of one’s spouse rather than by divorce, through which men could still have a 
number of wives, enjoy larger reproductive success and reap certain financial rewards. 
In the early period (from settlement until at least 1750) as a result of the large age differential 
between men and women upon first marriage, widowhood was almost a certainty for women 
in the Cape. This presented a unique opportunity for men to accumulate wealth through 
                                                          
11 Of course not everyone at the Cape married their cousin or into the same families as their siblings. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a share of the population married immigrants, suggesting that family connections and 
financial resources were not the only defining factor in an individual’s choice of spouse, since most new 
immigrants who married at the Cape would not yet have been well-established in society (Mitchell, 2007:8). 
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strategic marriage to wealthy widows. Guelke and Shell (1983) note that a similar situation 
unfolded in the colonial settlement of Virginia in North America: 
In Virginia, the death rate produced such a rapid turnover of husbands and wives that 
widowhood became a principal means for the concentration of wealth...The man who 
needed capital could get it most easily by marrying a widow. And she was likely to get 
it back again, with whatever he had added to it, when he died (Morgan quoted in 
Guelke & Shell, 1983:279).  
Unions of this nature are reported frequently enough at the Cape to look like conscious 
strategy rather than repeated coincidence. Notorious widow-marrier and one of the richest 
men at the Cape during the eighteenth century, Martin Melck, allegedly made his fortune by 
strategically marrying wealthy Cape widows. Melck came from humble beginnings as a farm 
labourer for one John Philip Giebler, but upon Giebler’s death, Melck married his widow by 
the name of Anna Margeretha Hop and in doing so became owner of two of the most 
prestigious farms in the Stellenbosch district namely Elsenburg and Muldersvlei. Upon his 
first wife’s death, he quickly remarried the widow of Hercules Malan, one Maria Rosina 
Loubser, once again increasing his estate. Guelke and Shell (1983:280) report a number of 
the Cape’s wealthiest men to have been so-called widow-marriers, including Adam Tas, Jan 
Cloete, Jan Blignaut and Henning Viljoen. 
At the heart of the matter, though, is the fact that the role fulfilled by widows in the Cape 
made them conduits for the accumulation and transmission of property and slaves from one 
generation to the next. While land may have changed hands regularly at the Cape, the 
resulting owners were regularly related by marriage. Families were not necessarily tied to 
specific estates but were frequently confined to specific localities. Women were therefore 
central to ensuring the preservation of wealth (Hall, 1994), and marriage within relatively 
limited geographical boundaries helped limit th e destructive effects of partible inheritance 
system (Dooling, 2005:159). 
4.3 Accessibility to, and the size of, the labour market  
Beyond the central role played by women in facilitating the transfer and maintenance of 
wealth at the Cape, the involvement of women in the labour force played a driving role in the 
Cape’s economic development. De Moor and van Zanden posit that the increased access to 
employment after the Black Death and the bourgeoning labour market for women played a 
critical role in fostering a unique set of conditions under which EMP-characteristics could 
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flourish. Testing this hypothesis against our knowledge of the Cape experience is not 
straightforward since the structure of Cape’s labour market was markedly different from that 
of Europe at the time of the emergence of the EMP. Moreover, the Cape did not suffer a 
comparable exogenous shock to its population growth resulting in a sudden increase in 
demand, particularly for women, in the labour market.  
Instead, the Cape was relatively fortunate in its unique endowment of human and natural 
resources. Land and inexpensive slave labour were abundant and as a result all major sectors 
of the Cape’s agrarian economy, specifically the production of wheat and wine and the 
ranching of sheep and cattle, underwent slow and steady expansion over time. Pieter van 
Duin and Robert Ross (1987) report that the Cape’s economic growth resulted from the slow 
and steady expansion of both the internal and external markets leading to a general increase 
in wealth in the colony. They emphasise, however, that this does not imply anything about 
the level of success with which this affected individual’s members of the society nor how 
wealth was distributed. 
This view of the Cape’s economy is supported inter alia by Boshoff and Fourie (2010) who 
demonstrate that the Colony attained significant economic growth from the combination of 
exporting goods to other settlement as providing services to passing ships; and De Zwart 
(2011) who, by calculating long term real wages at the Cape, shows that the eighteenth 
century was a period of steady growth in living standards and by the nineteenth century, Cape 
living standards were on par with those on the European continent.   
Largely supported by subsistence agriculture, the Cape’s economy was not for the most part, 
based on wage-labour. Observing economic life in the 1730’s Mentzel (1944) recalls that: 
The inhabitants and free burghers derive their living principally from grain growing, 
vegetable gardening and viniculture. Besides, all of them either engage in trades, for 
instance as blacksmiths, wagon builders, tailors, boot makers, carpenters and 
thatchers, or they keep a general dealer’s and wine shop. 
Fourie (2012:6) confirms this, reporting that by the early period employment was already 
diversified across the major sectors of the economy. Primary sector occupations ranged from 
crop and stock farming, predominantly in the Drakenstein area; to more productive 
employment in the form of bakers, brewers, millers and artisans closer to Cape Town; to 
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services provision in Cape Town and its immediate surroundings12. Productive labour was 
therefore by no m eans absent from the life at the Cape, nor was women’s involvement 
therein. Recall Mentzel’s typology of the third class of hardworking farmers who laboured 
alongside their slaves. All members of such households, including women and children 
participated in agricultural production. On women’s roles within the Cape’s agriculture based 
economy, Patterson (1957:240) notes that: 
The Boer woman’s place was beside and a little behind the male head of the 
household. The household and family were her charge and she knew nothing of 
emancipation…She taught the children to read the Bible and heard their 
Catechism. She sent her man to war or on commando, and worked the land and 
defended the home while he was away. Usually she was no meek housewife but a 
spirited and strong-willed creature. 
For those women who did not labour alongside their husbands on the land, many worked in 
the production of agricultural by-products or as teachers, nurses and wine traders (Fourie, 
2012:7). As for women in the later period, the traveller, Borcherdts, recalls the picture of a 
typical Stellenbosch woman in 1861:  
Seated for hours in the back hall at a small table, tea tray in front of her, regulating 
the household, acting as family scribe and dealing out home-made medicinal 
remedies (Patterson, 1957:243).  
In short, the presence of women in daily economic life at the Cape remained relatively 
constant throughout the period of interest. While it is difficult to identify the extent to which 
this role may have increased as a result of the abolition of slavery in 1834 (although this did 
not in itself mean the immediate end of the practice of slavery altogether) (Ross, 1993:94), 
the trend of higher ages at marriage for women and the diminishing age differential between 
husbands and wives had long since evolved (see Figure 6). The emergence of EMP-like 
marriage patterns in spite of the continued involvement of women in the labour market at the 
Cape challenges De Moor and van Zanden’s third hypothesis. New explanations must 
therefore be sought for the emergence of this Pseudo-EMP at the Cape. 
                                                          
12 See Table A5 in Appendix A for a breakdown of employment by sector.  
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4.4 Explaining the Pseudo-EMP at the Cape 
In the search to understand the evolution of the Pseudo-EMP at the Cape, Occam’s razor 
might be gainfully employed; that is to say, the simplest explanation is in all likelihood the 
best. Gary Becker’s seminal work entitled A Theory of Marriage (1973) is one such simple 
approach, proposing that marital behaviour can be examined in a t raditional economic 
framework based on t wo basic assumptions regarding marriage: Firstly, since marriage is 
typically entered into on a voluntary basis, either instigated by two individuals wanting to 
marry or by their parents, it c an be assumed that individuals’ expected utility is raised by 
marrying. Secondly, since men and women compete to find suitable marriage partners, a 
marriage market can be presumed to exist (Becker, 1973:300). 
A simple, albeit artificial way to order the way in which marriage decisions are made is to say 
that individuals first decide when to enter the marriage market and thereafter endeavour to 
find a suitable marriage partner. Becker argues that earlier marriage will occur for those 
individuals who desire a larger number of children; whose expected lifetime income is 
higher; and whose level of education is lower. Once in the marriage market, a p erson will 
search for a partner until the value of any expected improvement in the mate he can find is no 
greater than the cost of his time and other inputs into additional search. The gain from 
marriage has to be balanced against the costs to determine whether the marriage is 
worthwhile. The larger the gain is relative to the costs, the larger the net gain from marriage; 
presumably therefore, the larger too is the fraction of persons who marry. Since the benefits 
will be greater the longer the expected duration of marriage, people will search more 
carefully and marry later when they expect to be married longer, for example, when divorce 
is more difficult or adult death rates are lower (Becker, 1973:335). 
The search for a marriage partner would likewise be longer if more potential mates were 
available, as the expected gain from additional “sampling” would be greater. Marriage then 
should generally be later in dynamic, mobile, and diversified societies than in static, 
homogenous ones, ceteris paribus (Becker, 1973:336). People marry relatively early when 
they are “lucky” in their search but will also marry early when they are overly pessimistic 
about their prospects of attracting someone better (or overly optimistic about persons they 
have already met). Therefore early marriages contain both lucky and pessimistic persons, 
while later marriages contain unlucky and optimistic ones (Becker, 1973: 336). 
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The case of the Cape Colony fits nicely into Becker’s typology. From 1750 the age-sex ratio 
becomes balanced resulting in a larger variety of potential spouses in the same age cohort. As 
a result, the competition for brides, that had previously been driving the age of women at first 
marriage lower and lower, eased, allowing for the age difference between spouses to first 
diminish and ultimately disappear by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Consequently, 
age at first marriage, for women in particular, steady increased (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Age at first marriage and household size at the Cape, 1700-1850 
These increases in women’s age at marriage however, are not immediately reflected in 
household size by my estimate. Figure 6 plots male and female age at first marriage together 
with household size over time. Given the nature of the genealogical registers, household size 
is calculated as the average number of children a man fathers in his lifetime with all partners 
and should not be confused with the traditional measure of female fertility. It is only by the 
end of the nineteenth century that household size begins to diminish for the first time possibly 
resulting from the impact of industrialization on female fertility (Wannamaker, 2012; Galor, 
2011) and the effects of war (Cilliers & Fourie, 2012).  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The literature subsequent to the detection of the EMP lacks a unified explanation for the 
underlying causes of the EMP. De Moor and van Zanden are the first to address this 
shortcoming by proposing three hypotheses for the underlying causes of the EMP namely: the 
shift towards consensus versus paternal authority in the formation of marriages; property 
rights and the role of women in the transfer of property between husband and wife and 
between parents and children; and lastly, an increased role for women in the labour market. 
The Cape Colony is offered as a more suitable testing ground to display the unique features 
of the EMP. Using genealogical records to track the ancestry of colonial settlers in South 
Africa, this study estimated Cape Colony marriage patterns for the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. In addition to the new descriptive statistics provided, the large and 
significant impact of the European heritage, religion and class divisions in a society facing 
continuous immigration was evaluated.  
Marriage patterns in the early period (up to 1750) conformed to Hajnal’s description of the 
non-EMP, typical of patriarchal, pre-industrial, agriculture-based societies. A distinct 
marriage pattern, however, was discovering to have emerged at the Cape in the mid-
eighteenth century. This was termed a Pseudo-EMP, as it appears to be similar in its 
distinctive features to Hajnal’s traditional EMP but differs from De Moor and van Zanden’s 
theories of the underlying causes of the EMP.  
A critical discussion of the validity and potential shortcomings of the three De Moor and van 
Zanden hypotheses for the underlying causes of the EMP revealed that (i) the Cape society 
did not experience a comparable shift towards consensus rather than paternal authority in the 
formation of marriages but remained a fairly patriarchal society throughout the period of 
interest. This does not diminish the importance of the role that women, especially widows, 
played in facilitating the accumulation and transfer of property from one generation to the 
next and the role that women played in the formation and preservation of relationships. (ii) 
While the complex system of partible inheritance and land tenure at the Cape played a major 
role in the marriage strategies of individuals at the Cape as demonstrated by the frequency of 
familial marriage and the rise of a C ape “widowarchy”, it seems to have been more 
influential in determining who an individual would marry rather than when. And finally, (iii) 
women’s involvement in daily economic life and active participation in the labour market at 
the Cape remained relatively constant throughout the period of interest.  
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The emergence of the Pseudo-EMP in spite of these notable differences from the European 
experience calls into question the validity of the three De Moor and van Zanden hypotheses 
for the underlying causes of the EMP. New explanations therefore had to be sought for the 
emergence of this Pseudo-EMP at the Cape.  
Marital behaviour is therefore examined in the simple economic framework proposed by 
Becker (1973) in which individuals first decide when to enter the marriage market and 
thereafter endeavour to find a suitable marriage partner. Earlier marriage occurs for 
individuals who, (i) desire a larger number of children (ii) whose expected lifetime income is 
higher, and (iii) whose level of education is lower. Once in the marriage market, a person will 
search for a partner until the value of any expected improvement in the mate he can find is no 
greater than the cost of his time and other inputs into additional search.  
I posit that marriage patterns at the Cape resulted primarily from the balancing out of the age-
sex ratio after 1750 resulting in a larger variety of potential spouses for individuals in the 
same age cohort. As a result, the competition for brides that had previously been driving the 
age of women at first marriage down, eased, allowing for the age difference between spouses 
to first diminish and ultimately disappear by the beginning of the nineteenth century.  
What remains to be explored is the causal link between the demographic pattern of higher 
female age at marriage and economic growth at the Cape and whether the rise in demand for 
human capital in the process of development was the main trigger for the decline in fertility 
and the transition to modern growth. This goes beyond the scope of this dissertation but is an 
invitation for future research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1: Census Population: White Settlers, African and Asian Slaves, Free Blacks and 
Knechts. Summary of Totals 
  1682 1705 1731 
  No % No.  % No. % 
African/Asian 
Slaves 192 33.4 1057 37.8 4303 58.9 
"Free Blacks" 49 8.5 111 4 295 4 
White Knegts 45 7.8 66 2.4 83 1.1 
White settlers 288 50.2 1559 55.8 2627 35.9 
       Total 574 100 2793 100 7308 100 
       Note: Census population excludes Company personnel, Company slaves, 
Khoikhoi and San 
Source: Guelke, L. (1988: 459). 
 
 
Table A2: Life span of adult settlers 
  Males Females 
District 1705 1731 1705 1731 
  Age N Age N Age N Age N 
Cape Town 58.6 17 53.9 62 49.8 18 54.9 64 
Rural 48.9 59 57 194 45.1 38 59.2 130 
Frontier 55.8 49 52.7 72 57 27 54.2 41 
Colony 52.9 125 55.5 328 52.4 83 57.2 235 
         Source: Guelke, L. (1988: 466). 
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Table A3: Average number of children of adult settlers 
  Males Females 
District 1705 1731 1705 1731 
  ANC N ANC N ANC N ANC N 
Cape Town 5.4 36 5.5 88 5.3 32 6.2 73 
Rural 4.9 87 7.2 176 5.9 67 7.9 151 
Frontier 6.7 45 7.4 58 8 43 8 58 
Colony 5.5 168 6.8 322 6.4 142 7.5 282 
         Note: ANC = Average number of children an individual had in a lifetime with all partners. 
Source: Guelke (1988:467). 
 
Table A4: Fertility of female settlers  
District 
No. of 
Cases 
N/Tot 
Age at 
First Child 
Age at 
Final Child 
Fertility 
Period (FP) ANC FP/ANC 
1705             
Cape Town 18/81 19.1 33.9 14.8 6.3 2.3 
Rural 33/120 19.2 33.6 14.3 6.4 2.2 
Frontier 19/67 18.3 38.6 20.3 10.1 2 
Colony 70/268 18.9 34.9 16 7.4 2.2 
       1731             
Cape Town 72/143 20.4 33.8 13.4 6.3 2.1 
Rural 152/231 19.9 38 18.1 8.3 2.2 
Frontier 56/71 19.9 36.2 16.3 8.2 2 
Colony 280/445 20 36.6 16.6 7.8 2.1 
       Note 1: N = the number of women for whom data were available . 
 Tot = the total number of settler women in that district at the time of the census 
Note 2: The number of years between the birth of the first child and the birth of the final 
child 
Note 3: ANC = Average number of children of men and women from all partners 
Note 4: Average number of years between births of children; calculated by dividing fertility 
period by total number of children 
       Source: Guelke, L. (1988: 468). 
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Table A5: Employment type as percentage of the population by district, 1732 
  Cape Town District Stellenbosch Drakenstein 
Farmers 22.8 56.7 87.2 
Other Primary 6.7 3.5 0 
Secondary 21.9 8.5 0.3 
Tertairy 15.6 1.4 0.3 
Other Primary 32.9 29.8 12.2 
N 416 141 288 
Source: Schutte (1980); Fourie (2012). 
Figure A1: Median life span of settlers by decade of death with 95 per cent confidence bands, 
1700-1940 
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Appendix B: Digitising GISA (2008)13 
 
At the outset, digitising the data into a functional format for this study proved an enormous 
task. The first step in the data-capturing process was to create a custom-designed data-
manipulation software programme that was able to convert the text-file PDFs into an Excel 
compatible format that captured only the relevant information. This was a cumbersome task 
as the programme, while innovative, was not able to distinguish between successive families 
and meant that data had to be fed through the programme on a family by family basis.  
Given the nature of the dataset, our investigation of household characteristics meant we 
needed to link fathers to their offspring. To do this we first had to create a unique identity 
(ID) for each person in the dataset, and match that ID to a household ID. Under each family’s 
surname we listed each family member’s generation number (using ‘A’ to signify the first 
arrival) and number in the household (using ‘1’ to signify the first born). This enables us to 
link children to their father and to each other.  
The complete dataset covers 14,048 families with information on 401,602 individuals. The 
following information was captured for each individual: surname; first names; generation 
number, birth date, baptism date; death date; birth place; baptism place; death place; marriage 
variables up to five marriages; marriage dates and places; and unique individual identifiers 
and household identifiers for analysis purposes. Of the 401,602 e ntries, 323,167 c ontain 
information on birth or baptism date, or both, and 84,609 entries contain information on birth 
or baptism date, or both, and death date. Such numbers offer the promise of better parameter 
estimation that large datasets make possible.  
Mistakes inevitably crop up in work involving information that was collected from various 
sources and which was then rewritten several times before publication. In the compilation of 
the South African Genealogical Registers many of the documents were copies of originals 
that had been lost, some of the documents contained errors, and in some the writing was 
faded, indistinct and sometimes almost illegible. The obvious errors – such as when an 
individual’s death date was listed as ten years before his birth date – were easily removed, 
but, fortunately, were only a tiny fraction of the full sample, which point again to the benefits 
of the large sample size. 
                                                          
13 This is an excerpt from Cilliers and Fourie (2012), Economic History of Developing Regions (Forthcoming). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
The most serious problem in working with baptism dates is simply that some children were 
never baptised or their baptism was not registered. Alternatively the names of either the 
children or their parents may have been entered incorrectly. However, the traditional way of 
naming children in Afrikaner families proved to be a big help to genealogists. The eldest son 
was usually named after the paternal grandfather and the second son after the maternal 
grandfather and the eldest daughter was named after the maternal grandmother and the 
second daughter after the paternal grandmother, as shown in Figure 2, an excerpt from the 
South African Genealogical Registers (2008). 
Ross (1975, 220) notes a further potential problem, which is that “farmers who lived in the 
remote interior came to town so rarely that they [brought] walking children for baptism and 
sometimes several at a time”. Ross notes that if this was common practice it would hamper 
demographic analysis, but fortunately GISA (2008) documents these instances as ‘multiple 
baptisms’, and in fact, according to Ross’s calculations, they were fairly uncommon: he 
estimates that “baptisms [were] rarely delayed for more than four to six months”. Our data 
confirms the tradition of multiple baptisms. In our full dataset of 401,602 entries there are 
139,739 entries that have both a birth date and a baptism date. By calculating the average 
interval between the birth date and baptism date of these individuals, we can see that, on 
average, children were baptised within the first year of their lives. Accordingly, in cases 
where a person’s birth date is omitted we have used the baptism date as a proxy for the birth 
date.  
Death dates are far less frequent in the registers. Ross (1975, 219) attributes this omission to 
early South African burial customs. Calvinism, the dominant religion of the settlers, does not 
call for any formal sacrament or burial ritual as part of the funeral proceedings, so burials 
often took place without the presence of a clergyman who might have kept a record of such 
events. As there were few churches and nearly all of them were in towns, it was customary 
for each farm to maintain its own plot of hallowed ground in which its members were buried. 
The resulting record-keeping deficiency prompted civil authorities to take it upon themselves 
to record deaths, and in 1714 they ordered clergymen to notify them prior to a burial.  
However, record-keeping of deaths remained poor in spite of this directive (Ross 1975, 
219).This reduction of the sample size owing to the missing dates of death may introduce two 
biases into the results. First, people who owned a large number of possessions, assets or 
property were more likely to have had their deaths recorded, since their estate would have 
had to be dealt with in some fashion. The result is that our life span calculations may be 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
71 
 
biased away from those who were entirely destitute. There is thus the possibility then that our 
life span estimates are biased upwards.  
This bias should at least be consistent if the percentage of non-recording remains the same 
across the sample period. However, this is not the case, at least towards the end of our sample 
period. Figure 3 compares the sample size with estimates of the total population over the 
period. For the 18th century there is a close correlation between the size of the sample and the 
size of the total population, but by the mid-19th century the correlation has weakened, and by 
the turn of the 20th century growth in the sample size has slowed considerably relative to the 
total population. Interpretations of 20th century estimates should thus be undertaken with 
care, as we are not sure to what extent the missing entries may create an upward bias. 
A second potential bias results from the non-recording of deaths of very young infants. In 
these cases there is a high likelihood that neither the birth nor the death was ever registered. 
Yaukey et al. (2007, 122) note that even if a large percentage of infant deaths were registered, 
they may often have been misallocated in place and time. Where administrative systems were 
not well developed and deaths were not registered until after some delay, there may have 
been a temptation to record the date of death as the date of registration rather than the actual 
date of occurrence.  If this was common practice, the under-reporting of infant deaths could 
result in our infant mortality rates being slightly underestimated.  
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